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LEGISLATION AFFECTING LABOR INJUNCTIONS"-
FELLX FRANKFURTER AND NATHAN GREENE
On May 27, 1895, the Supreme Court of the United States for
the first time in its history passed on the scope and validity of
an injunction in a labor controversy. Yet the very next year
this modern application of an ancient procedure was made a
party issue, and since then has maintained itself as a lively
political problem. "Government by injunction" was the slogan
by which the Democratic platform of 1896 inveighed against
the practice of issuing labor injunctions. Since 1908, also the
Republican Party has proposed the correction of abuses due to
judicial intervention in labor conflicts. In response to this agi-
tation, important federal legislation was enacted in 1914. But
the hopes in which it was conceived soon foundered. Protest
revived and grew. And so, in the campaign of 1928 both parties
committed themselves to the need of further legislation. What
is true of the nation is true of the states. In 1896 the Chief
Justice of Massachusetts remarked that "The practice of issuing
injunctions in cases of this kind is of very recent origin." I Since
then the practice has had rich growth, giving rise to vigorous
counter-agitation. State legislatures have followed Congress in
corrective legislation, but proposals for curbing resort to labor
injunctions continue to be urged alike by Democratic and Repub-
lican governors.
A full understanding of the history of a legal institution under
scrutiny is necessary to wise reform. How labor injunctions
came to be and how they operate in practice, the uses which
they serve and the abuses to which they have given rise, must
be known if we are to determine whether the practice of issuing
injunctions serves our present needs, and if so, how they may
be realized. Elsewhere we have attempted to tell this story.
This article is confined to a history of the legislation to which the
labor injunction has given rise, and, more particularly, of federal
legislation in this field.
The issuance of an injunction in labor disputes is conditioned
by the substantive law that determines legitimacy of challenged
behavior as well as by the principles and procedure of equity con-
trolling the exercise of injunctive powers. In responding to
demands for the correction of alleged evils in this domain of
* This in substance will be a chapter in a forthcoming book entitled
"The Labor Injunction."




law, legislatures must consider the policy of society towards
industrial strife, and also the forms of legal remedy and the
methods of their employment appropriate to proscribed conduct.
Reform of abuses revealed by the use of labor injunctions there-
fore presents a variety of problems for legislative solution.
Legislation might immunize activities of organized labor from
all tort liability-pecuniary responsibility as well as restraint of
conduct-or merely define the conduct that is to be deemed a
wrong. Again, legislation might withdraw from the scope of in-
junctive relief activities normally prevalent in labor contro-
versies, or merely fashion a procedure especially suitable to in-
junctions in such cases. Legislation has entered all these fields.
LEGISLATION AFFECTING SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Outright exception of trade union activity from liability for
tortious acts, such as the English Trade Disputes Act of 1906 2
introduced, has not been made by any American legislature. In
an advisory opinion to the Massachusetts Senate, the Justices of
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 1912 considered
such a proposal and dealt it an effective quietus.3 In the opinion
2 6 EDW. VII, c. 47 (1906): "4.-(I) An action against a trade union,
whether of workmen or masters, or against any members or officials thereof
on behalf of themselves and all other members of the trade union in respect
of any tortious act alleged to have been committed by or on behalf of the
trade union, shall not be entertained by any court." "The Act was passed
in direct opposition to the dogmatic principles prevailing at the time as to
liability for torts and the responsibility of principals for tortious acts of
their agents. The dialectical side of the problem had been fully considered
and settled by the judgment of the Court of Appeals of the Taff-Vale Case.
Parliament, however, passed the Trades Disputes Act as a measure neces-
sary to allow organized labour to exert its action as a counter-poise to the
power of capital wielded by the employers." 2 ViNOGRADOFF, COLLECTED
PAPERS (1928) 323. See Geldart, The Present Law of Trade Disputes and
Trade Unions (1914) PoLrnIcAL QUARTERLY No. 2, 16-71; WEBB, HISTOR OV
TRADE UNIONISM (1920) 604-08; DICEY, LAW AND OPINION IN ENGLAND
(2d ed. 1919) p. xliv et seq; TILLYARD, INDUSTRIAL LAW (2d ed. 1928). The
general strike of 1926 also had its reflex in English legislation, resulting in
the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 17 & 18 GEO. V, c. 22 (1927).
See the debates upon this measure in the House of Lords, 68 HANS. DEB.
2 et. seq., particularly the speech of the Marquis of Reading, at 67.
3 Opinion of the Justices, 211 Mass. 618, 98 N. E. 337 (1912). For a
defense of advisory opinions generally, see Hudson, Advisory Opinions of
National and International Courts (1924) 37 HARv. L. REV. 970, and for a
criticism, semble, see Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions (1924) 37
HARv. L. REv. 1002, 1006: "... advisory opinions are bound to move in
an unreal atmosphere. The impact of actuality and the intensities of im-
mediacy are wanting. In the attitude of court and counsel, in the vigor of
adequate representation of the facts behind legislation (lamentably inade-
quate even in contested litigation) there is thus a wide gulf of difference,
partly rooted in psychologic factors, between opinions in advance of legis-
lation and decisions in litigation after such proposals are embodied into law.
Advisory opinions are rendered upon sterilized and mutilated issues."
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of the Justices, such legislation would violate the "underlying
principles and fundamental provisions" both of the Mlassachu-
setts and the United States Constitutions-guarantees against
deprivation of life, liberty and property without due process of
law, guarantees of the equal protection of the laws and of abso-
lute equality before the law.
Measures granting a more restricted freedom to the promotion
of labor's claims have prevailed. In essence, they constitute at-
tempts to curb the two judicial conceptions which have played
the most prolific r6les in the evolution of the labor injunction-
the doctrines of "conspiracy" and of "restraint of trade." 4
In the decade from 1880 to 1890, at least eight states 5 passed
laws permitting "cobperation of persons employed in any call-
ing, trade or handicraft for the purpose of obtaining an advance
in the rate of wages or compensation or of maintaining such
rate." 6 But courtg stuck close in the bark of this language. A
strike in furtherance of trade union existence, though not im-
mediately in pursuit of the purposes of the statute, was held out-
side its pale; 7 since immunity only against criminal proceed-
4See Frankfurter and Greene, Injunction in American Labor Contro-
versies (1928) 44 L. Q. REV. 164, 165-66.
5 Ill. Laws 1873, 76; ME. REV. STAT. (1883) c. 126, § 18; Md. Acts 1884,
c. 226; MINN. PEN. CODE (1886) § 138; N. J. LAWS 1883, 36; N. Y. Laws
.1870, c. 18; N. Y. PEN. CODE (1881) § 170; N. Y. Laws 1882, c. 384; Pa.
Acts May 8, 1869; Pa. Acts June 14, 1872; Pa. Acts April 20, 1376; Pa.
Acts June 19, 1891. Early legislation that a strike is not a conspiracy:
MD. CODE OF PUB. GEN. LAWS (1888) art. 27, § 31; N. J. REv. STAT. (1877)
1296; BRIGHTLEY'S PA. DIG. (1885) 1172. A compilation of the statutes up
to 1892 was prepared under the direction of C. D. Wright, Commissioner of
Labor: A COMPILATION OF THE LABOR LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND
TERRITORIES AND 'THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT NO. 1960. See also
TENTH SPEcIAL REPORT OF COMMISSIONER OF LABOR (1904) and TW.TY-
SEcoND ANNUAL REPORT OF COMMISSIONER OF LABOR (1907), the latter be-
ing cumulative.
6N. Y. PEN. LAw (1926) § 582.
7Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 89 Misc. 501, 152 N. Y. Supp. 475
(Sup. Ct. 1915), aff'd, 227 N. Y. 1, 124 N. E. 97 (1919); Davis Machine Co.
v. Robinson, 41 Misc. 329, 84 N. Y. Supp. 837 (Sup. Ct. 1903); Grassi Con-
tracting Co. v. Bennett, 174 App. Div. 244, 160 N. Y. Supp. 279 (1st Dep't
1916); People v. Epstean, 102 Misc. 476, 170 N. Y. Supp. 68 (Gen. Sess.
1918), appeal dismissed, 190 App. Div. 899 (1919). It will be recalled that
a similar fate was visited upon the Massachusetts statute authorizing peace-
ful persuasion. See Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit. stpr note 4, at 187,
nn. 45-46. In the 1929 session of the Massachusetts legislature, a bill
(House No. 887) was introduced to legalize strikes "or other concerted
action" when the purposes sought to be attained thereby Nere, intcr alia-,
The closed shop and collective bargaining.
Some states have provided that workers might combine to carry out "their
legitimate purposes as freely as they could do if acting singly." MINN.
STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 4255; ORE. LAws (Olson, 1920) § 6817. But ob-
viously the question as to what are "legitimate purposes" remains very
large.
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ings was explicitly given, civil remedies remained unaffected
whether through an action for damages or a suit for an injunc-
tion., In Congress numerous bills were proposed for more effec-
tive sterilization of the conspiracy doctrine.9 They were never
enacted. The Wilson bill- of 1911 provided that no agreement
concerning "any act or thing to be done . . . with reference to
a labor dispute . . . should constitute a conspiracy unless
the act agreed upon would be unlawful if done by a single individ-
ual." 10 This would have drawn the sting of legal significance
from the fact of combination. The Clayton Act, in which the
Wilson proposals finally culminated, rejected such a provision
and left undisturbed existing judicial views of conspiracy. As
late as 1926 :1 another effort failed to secure enactment of the
policy embodied in the proposal of 1911. On the whole, legis-
lation has done little to restrict the courts in applying common
law notions of conspiracy to labor disputeb. We owe to the
judicial process such liberalization as there has been of the
conspiracy concept. 2 Legislation has merely registered judicial
modifications; it has not been creative.
Statutory innovation has been bolder in creating exceptions to
the anti-trust laws. Many states have saved organizations of
labor from the operation of statutes subjecting combinations in
"restraint of trade" to liability both criminal and civil. The
Nebraska Anti-Trust Act of 1897 13 was perhaps the earliest to,
exempt "any assemblies or associations of laboring men" for the
purpose of raising wages. This was deemed unconstitutional
favoritism when the law first came before a federal court sitting
in Nebraska:
"Dozens of statutes have been held invalid by appellate courts
which sought to make it invalid for one class of men to do one
thing and lawful for other men practically under the same cir-
cumstances, to do another, but like, thing." 14
8 See, e.g., Rogers v. Evarts, 17 N. Y. Supp. 264 (Sup. Ct. 1891); Frank
& Dugan v. Herold, 63 N. J. Eq. 443, 52 At]. 152 (1902); Jonas Glass Co.
v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Ass'n, 77 N. J. Eq. 219, 79 At]. 262 (1908). But
see Reynolds v. Everett, 67 Hun 294, 22 N. Y. Supp. 306 (Sup, Ct. 1893),
aff'd, 144 N. Y. 189, 39 N. E. 72 (1894).
9 S. 4233, H. R. 8917, 56th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. 89, H. R. 1234, H. R.
4063, 58th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. 6782, H. R. 8136, 58th Cong., 2d Sess.;
H. R. 4445, 59th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. 17137, 60th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R.
3058, 61st Cong., 1st Sess. Other early bills are referred to in Frankfurter
and Greene, op. cit. supra note 4, at 167, n. 21.
10 H. R. 11032, 62d Cong., 1st Sess. See HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE
COMI XITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, INJUNCTIONS (62d Cong., 2d Sess. 1912).
- S. 972, H. R. 3920, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. This bill is reprinted in
(1924) 6 LAW AND LABOR 85.
'12 See Brandeis, J. in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 361-62, 42 Sup.
Ct. 124, 140 (1921).
13 Laws of Neb. 1897, c. 79.
14 Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Cornell, 110 Fed. 816, 825 (C. C. D. N b. 1901).
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A year later the Nebraska Supreme Court reached a contrary
conclusion, holding that the legislature had made a reasonable
classification:
"The distinction between goods and merchandise produced by
skill and labor and the skill and labor which produced them is
manifest and reasonable." '7
So wrote Roscoe Pound, then a member of the Nebraska court.
In 1914 the Supreme Court of the United States sustained this
viewpoint in passing upon a similar Missouri statute. The Court
found nothing in the federal Constitution against a state's free-
dom to decide for itself "whether a combination of wage earners
. . . called for repression by law." 15
The attempt to withdraw labor unions from the scope of fed-
eral anti-trust legislation forms a long and spirited chapter of
congressional history. Following the early decisions by the fed-
eral courts holding that the Sherman Law covered combinations
of labor as well as of capital,17 the effort began in Congress
13 Cleland v. Anderson, 66 Neb. 252, 260, 92 N. W. 306, 308 (1902).
16 International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199, 34 Sup. Ct. 859
(1914). But cf. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, 22 Sup.
Ct. 431 (1902) and comment thereon by Mr. Taft in 1914: "Attempts are
being made in Congress to exclude from the operation of the antitrust act
trades-unions and farmers. I hope this will never be done. ... A law
with a similar exemption was passed by the legislature of Illinois. It was
held by the United States Supreme Court to be invalid because it denied to
all the people of Illinois the equal protection of laws. While that case was
under the Fourteenth Amendment, which prevents a State from denying
equal protection of the laws to any persons within its jurisdiction, it would
be a question whether the Supreme Court might not find in the first eight
amendments of the Constitution a prohibition upon Congressional legisla-
tion having similar unjust operation." Tu, THE ANTI-TnusT Acr AND
THE SUPREME COURT (1914) 98-99.
17 See Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit. supra note 4, at 170, 171. The
congressional debates on the Sherman Act are to be found in volume 21 of
the Record, especially as of March 27, 1890. On March 25, 1800, Senator
Sherman opposed a proviso excluding labor and farm organizations from
the terms of the Act. This proviso, agreed to in Committee of the Whole,
was out when the bill was again reported out of Committee to the floor of
the Senate on April 2, 1890.. Whether the reason for the deletion of the
proviso was opposition to it or a belief that the Act itself so clearly ex-
cluded labor that the proviso was unnecessary-the Record does not settle.
For weighty contemporaneous opinion that the amendment was unnecessary,
see the speeches of Senator Hoar, 21 CoNG. REC. 2729 (1M90), of Senator
Stewart, ibid. 2606, and of Senator Teller, ibid. 2562. The speech of
Senator Hoar is all the more significant as it was he who, as a member of
the Judiciary Committee, recast the bill. See 2 HOAR, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
SEVENTY YEARS (1903) 264 et seq.; cf. MASON, ORGANTIZ LAnOR ,ND THE:
LAw (1925) c. vii; and see Edmunds, Interstate Trmst and Goimcrec Act
of 1890 (1911) 194 N. AM. REV. 801; WASHBURN, THE HISTORY OF A STAT-
uTE (1927).
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to express a contrary intent. The Littlefield Anti-Trust Bill
of 1900 's was amended in the House by inserting the following
clause recommended by the minority 19 of the House Judiciary
Committee:
"Nothing in this act shall be so construed as to apply to trade
unions or other labor organizations organized for the purpose of
regulating wages, hours of labor, or other conditions under which
labor is to be performed."
The bill so amended passed the House 20 but was buried in th6
Senate Judiciary Committee.21 The proposal met the same fate
in the Fifty-seventh Congress, 22 in the Sixtieth Congress,5 in the
Sixty-second Congress.24 Failure by direct attack provoked a
more successful flank movement. Friends of the reform saw
their opportunity to restrict appropriations for enforcement of
the anti-trust laws by writing into the sundry appropriations
bills a proviso against using any funds for prosecutions of labor
organizations. Such a provision passed the House in 1910, but
IsIntroduced by Mr. Littlefield April 7, 1900, and referred to the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary. The bill was reported May 16, 1900, with amend-
ments (H. Rep. 1506 to accompany H. R. 10539, 56th Cong., 1st Sess.).
An even earlier bill was introduced in the 52d Congress (1st Sess.), H. R.
6640.
19 H. Rep. 1506, pt. 2, p. 4, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. to accompany H. R. 10539.
This bill, the amendments and reports are reprinted in a volume prepared
by the direction of the Attorney General, BILLS AND DEBATES IN CONGRESS
RELATING TO TRuSTS (1903). The minority report referred to said concern-
ing this proposed amendment that it ". . . explains itself, but we observe
that it is rather a curious fact, so far as we have been able to learn, that
the only criminal convictions ever obtained under the Sherman antitrust
law have been in cases of laboring men on a strike for higher wages, and
no trust magnate, officer, or agent has ever been put behind the bars .... 1
20 The bill in this form is reprinted in full in 34 CONG. REC. 2728 (1901).
2133 CONG. REC. 6669,70 (1900); 34 CONG. REC. 3438-39 (1901).
22H. R. 11988; H. R. 14947; S. 649 (1st Sess.).
23S. 6440; S. 6900; S. 6331; S. 6913 (1st Sess.). Hearings were had that
session on S. 6331 and S. 6440. See HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCO1IITTEE
OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY ON AMENDMENT OF SHERMAN
ANTITRUST LAW (1908).
24H. R. 40; H. R. 5606 (1st Sess.) referred to Committee on Judiciary.
See volumes prepared for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary, House
of Representatives, 3 BILLS AND DEBATES IN CONGRESS RELATING TO TRUSTS
2466 where the above-mentioned bills are reprinted.
These repeated failures were used by counsel as an argument before the
Supreme Court in Loewe v. Lawler, 208 U. S. 274, 280 (1908) to prove
congressional intent in the Sherman Law: "Congress, therefore, has re-
fused to exempt labor unions from the comprehensive provisions of the
Sherman law against combinations in restraint of trade, and this refusal
is the more significant, as it followed the recognition by the courts [infer-
ior federal courts] that the Sherman Anti-Trust law applied to labor or-
ganizations."
884
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did not come out of the Senate.23 It passed both Houses in 1913
but led to President Taft's veto.20 It again passed both Houses
later in 1913 and, though the item was strongly disapproved, the
bill was signed by President Wilson.27 Every similar appropria-
tion since thqn has carried the restriction that no money be
a" ..spent in the prosecution of any organization or individ-
ual for entering into any combination or agreement having in
view the increasing of wages, shortening of hours, or bettering
the conditions of labor, or for any act done in furtherance thereof
not in itself unlawful "128
Bills containing such a provision became law through the signa-
tures of President Harding and President Coolidge.
But greater promises were made to labor in the presidential
campaign of 1912. By its platform the Democratic Party was
committed to the withdrawal of labor and farm organizations
from condemnation by the Sherman Law.2 The election of
Woodrow Wilson made some action inevitable. Relief for labor
was an aim too deeply associated with Wilson's gospel of "the
new freedom" 30 not to survive campaign speeches. A cam-
paign promise is one thing; legislative performance quite an-
other. To trace the course of legislation by which performance
was attempted in this instance, is to gain insight into the physiol-
ogy of lawmaking when powerful social forces contend for
mastery.
As originally introduced in the House, the bill for the correc-
tion of abuses in issuing labor injunctions carried no exemption
of labor organizations from the scope of the anti-trust laws.
Upon the plea of Samuel Gompers, 3' spealdng for organized labor,
25 See the Senate debate thereon, 45 CONG. REC. 849-52 (1910) and Amer-
ican Federation of Labor letters insisting upon the proviso, ibid. A short
summary' of the congressional history of this legislation is given in 51
CONG. REC. 954041 (1914).
26 The veto message appears in 49 CONG. REC. 4833 (1913). He said in
part: "This provision is class legislation of the most vicious sort."
27 33 STAT. 53 (1913). The Senate debates are reported in 50 CONG. REC.
1096, 1102-14, 1189-97, 1269-86 (1913). President Wilson's statement issued
in connection with the signing of this bill said that if the proviso could have
been separated from the bill, he "would have vetoed that item, because it
places upon the expenditure a limitation which is, in my opinion, unjusti-
fiable in character and principle." He added: "I can assure the country
that this item will neither limit nor in any way embarrass the actions of
the Department of Justice. Other appropriations supply the department
with abundant funds to enforce the law." See 51 CONG. REC. 14604 (1914).2 8 See, e.g., 44 STAT. 1194 (1927) ; see LAmLER, BoCorTs AND Tnn LAnor
STRuGorL (1914) 260.
2 9 PROCEEDINGS OF THE DmiocATc NATIONAL CO=NVTION (1912) 372;
51 CONG. REC. 9165 (1914).
30oWooDRow WILsON, THE NEw FRlnoA (1913).
31 51 CON(. REc. 9165-66 (1914).
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a provision to this end was reported by the House committee, and
passed by the House. In the course of the Senate debate upon
the bill an amendment was proposed and adopted 32 in the form of
the famous sentence, "the labor of a human being is not a com-
modity or article of commerce." 33 By President Wilson's signa-
ture, these provisions, as Section 6 of the Clayton Act, became
law on October 14, 1914. The exact text of this section is im-
portant:
"Sec. 6. That the labor of a human being is not a commodity
or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws
shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor,
agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the
purpose of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted
for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such
organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be
held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws." 3
This measure brought labor, so it was thought, into the prom-
ised land. "Those words, the labor of a human being is not a
commodity or article of commerce," 35 Samuel Gompers informed
the trade union movement, "are sledge hammer blows to the
wrongs and injustices so long inflicted upon the workers. This
declaration is the industrial magna charta upon which the work-
ing people will rear their construction of industrial freedom."
32IbicL 14610.
33Ibid. 14590. Senator Cummins of Iowa: "It is high time that we
recognize the difference between the power of a man to produce some-
thing and the thing which he produces. . . . The thing in which he is
dealing is not a commodity, and if we do not recognize the difference be-
tween the labor of a human being and the commodities that are produced
by labor and capital . . . we have lost the main distinction that warrants,
justifies, and demands that labor organizations coming together for the
purpose of bettering the conditions under which they work . . . shall not
be reckoned to be within a statute which is intended to prevent restraints
of trade and monopoly." Ibid. 14585.
3438 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 17 (1926).
35 The identical clause or a paraphrase thereof appears in state statutes,
both antedating and following the Clayton Act. Such statutes are: Cal.
Stat. 1909, 594; CAT. GEN. LAws (Henning, 1920) act 5264, § 13; MIrNN.
STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 4258; ORE. LAWs (Olson, 1920) § 6817; WASH.
'ComP. STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 7613; Wis. STAT. (1927) § 133.05.
36 (1914) 21 AMERICAN FEDERATIONIST 971. In February of 1917, a
federal judge (Killits, D. J.) said: "We may as well call it an 'Employer's
Bill of Rights'. . . ." Stephens v. Ohio State Tel. Co., 240 Fed. 759, 770
(N. D. Ohio, 1917).
President Wilson's own characterization of the signficance of this legis-
lation may be recalled: "The workingmen of America have been given a
veritable emancipation, by the legal recognition of a man's labour as part
of his life, and not a mere marketable commodity; by exempting labour
organizations from processes of the courts which treated their members like
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Descending to particulars, Mr. Gompers added, "This declara-
tion removes all possibility of interpreting trust legislation
to apply to organizations of the workers, and their legitimate
associated activities." :7 Whether this expectation coincided
with congressional intent is meat for endless dialectic; the
debates in Congress looked both ways. When the bill was first
reported out of the House Judiciary Committee, one of its mem-
bers, referring specifically to the clause--"Nor shall such organi-
zations ...be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint
of trade, under the anti-trust laws"-said that this "would clearly
exempt labor organizations ... from the provisions of the anti-
trust laws"; that it "would give these organizations what they
have desired so long and all they have been struggling for since
the original enactment of the Sherman antitrust law." 25 An-
other member of the same committee told the House 'Tre are
taking them [labor organizations] out from the ban of the pres-
ent law to the extent that in future they cannot be dissolved as
unlawful combinations. Their existence is made lawful and they
are given a legal status." 39 These expressions may serve as a
cross-section of congressional opinion. Did the section merely
legalize what was already legal, i.e., the mere existence of labor
unions, or did it completely immunize labor organizations from
prosecution or suit under the Sherman Law? 4" The majority re-
port of the House Committee adopted the innocuous view of the
measure.4' A minority of the same committee suggested that the
act would merely prevent suits for the dissolution of labor or-
ganizations, but would continue to permit the issue of injunc-
tions under the Sherman Law to restrain them from carrying
out their puposes.42 No less equivocal is the evidence furnished
fractional parts of mobs and not like accessible and responsible individ-
uals... !' Woodrow Wilson's address accepting his renomination Sept. 2,
1916, 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF WooDRow WImsoN (1924) 302, 307.
35 See (1914) 21 AiERCAN FEDERATIONIsT, an editorial entitled, Anti-
Trust Law Enmeshes Labor. This material is reprinted in 51 CONG. Rcc.
16340 (1914).
38 Representative Henry of Texas, 51 CoNG. REC. 9540 (1914). He also
said, in part: "We are now about to correct that error, and make it plain
and specific, by clear-cut and direct language, that the antitrust laws
against conspiracies in trade shall not be applied to labor organizations and
farmers' unions." Ibid 9541.
32 Representative Floyd of Arkansas, 51 CONG. REC. 916G (1914).
40 Mr. MacDonald of Michigan lucidly exposed the verbal deception: "If
you mean to exempt these associations from this bill, exempt them and
say in so many words that this legislation is not intended to apply to the:e
organizations. Do not attempt to leave any loophole for the claim that
while the existence of these organizations is not prohibited yet the courts
may still hold the exercise of their vital functions unlawful." 51 CoN;G.
REc. 9249 (1914).
41 H. Rep. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. to accompany H. R. 15G57.
42 H. Rep. 627, pt. 3, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. to accompany H. R. 15657.
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by the debate in the Senate. Senator Pittman was confident that
as a result of the new measure the anti-trust laws have "nothing
to do with organized labor .. that any unlawful acts com-
mitted in the pursuit of the objects of their organizations shall
be tried and determined by other existing laws." 43 To which
Senator Cummins replied that "in my view he [Senator Pittman]
has stated just what section 7 [Section 6 of this bill as passed]
does not do." 44 A rather large group of Congressmen attacked
the legislation as futile if it aimed only at legislation of what
was already legal, and vicious if it accomplished the immuniza-
tion of labor from the anti-trust laws.45
This brief history illustrates how fictitious can become the
search of courts for "the intent of the legislature" in construing
ambiguous enactments. With a legislative history like that
which surrounds the Clayton Act, talk about the legislative in-
tent as a means of construing legislation is simply repeating an
empty formula. The Supreme Court had to find meaning where
Congress had done its best to conceal it.40 In June 1917,
in denying, for the majority of the Court, equitable relief in a
labor case 4 7 on the ground that the Sherman Law only author-
ized the government, and not private suitors, to obtain injunc-
tions and that the Clayton Act, which did grant such authority,"
came too late to apply to this case, Mr. Justice Holmes expressed
the view that even if the Clayton Act were applicable it "estab-
lishes a policy inconsistent with the granting of one [an injunc-
tion] here." 41 But, Mr. Justice Holmes added prophetically, "I
do not go into the reasoning that satisfies me because upon this
point I am in the minority." 50 Before very long another case
43 51 CONG. REC. 14588 (1914). His further remarkd are of interest:
"There are ample laws to punish men who commit crime .... There is no
fear that there will be lack of punishment. It is simply a question as to
whether or not labor ... should be subjected to this particular act. Labor
has always contended that it should not be subjected to this particular act,
because it is an act that depends largely upon the equity discretion of a
single judge or a court .... "
a451 CONG. REC. 14588 (1914).
45 51 CONG. REC. 9249 (MacDonald); 9082, 16283 (Volstead) ; 9544, 14021
(Thomas); 13918 (Borah); 14013 (Jones) (1914).
46 See Labor is not a Commodity (1916) 9 NEw REPUBLic 112; ibid. 243.
47Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S. 459, 37 Sup. Ct. 718 (1917).
4838 STAT. 737, § 16 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 26 (1926). Prior to the enact-
ment of this section, the rule was established that private parties were not
entitled to sue under the anti-trust laws to prevent or restrain a violation
of such laws.
49 Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, supra note 47, at 471, 37 Sup. Ct. at 720.
50 Ibid. Pitney, J. wrote the dissent, concurred in by McKenna and Van
Devanter, JJ. He said: "Neither in the language of the section, nor in the
committee reports, is there any indication of a purpose to render lawful or
legitimate anything that before the act was unlawful, whether in the objects
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compelled decision on the issue, and the majority of the Court
concluded that "there is nothing in the section [6] to exempt
such an organization or its members from accountability where
it or they depart from its normal and legitimate object and en-
gage in an actual combination or conspiracy in restraint of
trade." "' The long drawn-out battle on the national stage, to
withdraw labor tactics from the risks of judicial notions con-
cerning "restraint of trade," was fought and lost.
The attempted modification of one other judicial doctrine of
substantive law remains to be noted. The courts had ruled that
it is illegal to persuade employees to join a union when such
workers are under contract to their employers not to become
union members while in their employ. This doctrine plays a lead-
ing part in the industrial conflict. Recognizing that such agree-
ments, certainly in large measure, represent the superior eco-
nomic position of the employer by virtue of which the theoretical
freedom of an employee to refuse assent was illusory and that
such agreements therefore emptied of meaning the "right of col-
lective bargaining," legislatures, particularly in the industrial-
ized states, passed laws prohibiting the discharge of an employee
merely because of his membership in a labor union, and for-
bidding employers to require workers to agree not to become or
remain union members. Such statutes were passed in quick suc-
cession in many states, including Connecticut, fllinois, Kansas,
Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.*2 A like measure, sponsored by
Richard Olney, Cleveland's Attorney General, was also passed by
Congress as a result of the abuses of discrimination against
of such an organization or its members or in the measures adopted for
accomplishing them." Ibid. 484, 37 Sup. Ct. at 725.
53Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 469, 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 177 (1921).
Pitney, J., now writing the majority opinion, said: "As to § 0, it seems to
us its principal importance in this discussion is for what it does zot author-
ize, and for the limit it sets to the immunity conferred. The section as-
smmes the normal objects of a labor organization to be legitimate, and
declares that nothing in the anti-trust laws shall be construed to forbid
the edstence and operation of such organizations or to forbid their mem-
bers from lawfully carrying out their legitimate objects; and that such an
organization shall not be held in itself-merely because of its existence and
operation-to be an illegal combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade."
52 N. Y. PEN. CODE (1887) § 171a; MIo. Laws 1893, 187; Qino R1EV. STAT.
(Bates, 1903) §§ 4364-4366; Pa. Act of June 4, 1897; Wis. Laws 1899, c.
032; ILL. REV. STAT. (Hurd, 1899) 844; KAN. GEN. STAT. (1901) §§ 2425,
2426; MASS. GEN. LAws (1912) c. 149, § 20; ORE. LAws (Olson, 1920) §
2181; Okla. Acts 1907-1908, 513; OKLA. COMP. LAws (1909) § 4041; Co,,r.
GEN. STAT. (1918) § 6359. See BuLLE-riN OF THE BURnAU oF LABon STATiS-
Tics, No. 148, Vols. I and 11.
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union men reported to Congress by the weighty commission that
inquired into the causes of the Pullman strike.,
But state courts, and later the Supreme Court of the United
States, denied the power of states 54 and nation 5 to pass such
legislation. It ran counter to judicial conceptions of "liberty of
contract" which the Supreme Court discovered within the "vague
contours" 56 of the due process clause. Though actually interven-
ing in the push and tussle of the industrial conflict and the forces
of contending social classes, the Court seemed not to move out-
53 JAMES, RICHARD OLNEY (1923) c. 5; 2 MCELRoY, GROVER CLEVELAND
(1923) c. 5; Olney, Discrimination Against Union Labor-Legal? (1908)
42 Ai. L. REV. 161.
54 People v. Marcus, 185 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 1073 (1906) ; State v. Julow,
129 Mo. 163, 31 S. W. 781 (1895); Gillespie v. The People, 188 Ill. 176, 58
N. E. 1007 (1900); State v. Bateman, 7 Ohio N. P. 487 (1900); State v.
Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 530, 90 N. W. 1098 (1902); Brick Co. v. Perry, 69
Kan. 297, 76 Pac. 848 (1904); Goldfield Consol. Mines v. Goldfield M. U.
No. 220, 159 Fed. 500 (C. C. D. Nev. 1908); People v. Western Union Co.,
70 Colo. 90, 198 Pac. 146 (1921); Montgomery v. Pacific Electric Ry., 293
Fed. 680 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923). These rulings were, in effect, sustained by
the Supreme Court in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240
(1915), considered in (1915) 15 COL. L. REV. 272; (1915) 28 HARV. L. REV.
496, 518; (1915) 13 MICH. L. REV. 497; (1915) 24 YALE L. J. 677. And
see Powell, Collective Bargaining Before the Supreme Court (1918) 33 POL.
Scr. Q. 396.
55 Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277 (1908) invali-
dating § 10 of the Erdman Act. By this legislation, Congress carried
out the recommendation of the commission that investigated the causes of
the Pullman strike. See UNITED STATES STRIKE COMMISSION, REPORT ON
THE CHICAGO STRIKE OF JUNE-JULY 1894 (1895). The specific section in
question made it criminal for an interstate carrier to discharge an em-
ployee because of his membership in a labor union. This provision was
invalidated not only on the ground that it was an invasion of the guaran-
tees of liberty and property of the Fifth Amendment, but also on the ground
that such legislation was not within the power of Congress to enact. Re-
minding that the power to regulate commerce authorizes only such legisla-
tion as has "some real or substantial relation to or connection with the
commerce regulated," the Court asked "what possible legal or logical con-
nection is there between an employee's membership in a labor organization
and the carrying on of interstate commerce?" Adair v. United States,
supra at 178, 28 Sup. Ct. at 282. For a criticism of the case and an answer
to the Court's question, see Olney, loc. cit. supra note 53, and Pound, Liberty
of Contract (1909) 18 YALE L. J. 454.
56 "In present conditions a workman not unnaturally may believe that
only by belonging to a union can he secure a contract that shall be fair to
him.... If that belief, whether right or wrong, may be held by a reason-
able man, it seems to me that it may be enforced by law in order to estab-
lish the equality of position between the parties in which liberty of contract
begins. Whether in the long run it is wise for the workingmen to enact
legislation of this sort is not my concern, but I am strongly of opinion that
there is nothing in the Constitution of the United States to prevent it, and
that Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, and Lochner v. New York, 198
U. S. 45 should be overruled." Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting in Coppago
v. Kansas, supra note 54, at 26-27, 35 Sup. Ct. at 248.
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side the logical frame-work of an abstract syllogism. Freedom of
contract and the right of private property are protected by the
Constitution; "wherever the right of private property exists,
there must and will be inequalities of fortune"; nT it is "impos-
sible to uphold freedom of contract and the right of private prop-
erty without at the same time recognizing as legitimate the in-
equalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise
of those rights." 5 Such reasoning presupposes a perfectly bal-
anced symmetry of rights: the employer and employee are on an
equality, and legislation which disturbs that equality is an arbi-
trary interference "with the liberty of contract which no govern-
ment can legally justify in a free land."50 In vain did Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes oppose such pernicious abstractions with insistence
on the justification of such legislation whereby law seeks to
further that true "equality of position between the parties in
which liberty of contract begins." r1 Against such efforts the
majority invoked the Constitution.
Employers heavily capitalized the failure of this legislation,
particularly after the Hitchman Case.". Building upon the dis-
ability of legislatures to prohibit "yellow dog contracts," em-
ployers used these agreements to create barriers against unioni-
zationC2 In the Hitchman Case, it will be recalled, the Supreme
Court gave equitable protection to these agreements by enjoining
employees who had subscribed to such agreements, even when
57 Ibid. 17, 35 Sup. Ct. at 244.
rs Ibid. 17, 35 Sup. Ct. at 245.
59 Harlan, J. in Adair v. United States, supra note 55, at 175, 28 Sup. CL
at 280. The lively persistence in the United States of an abstract concep-
tion concerning "liberty of contract" long after it was rejected by conserva-
tive English statesmen and English legislation to modern conditions, is il-
lustrated by this statement of Lord Randolph Churchill to Mr. Moore
Bayley in 1884: "In answer to your question as to my views on the
rights of contract I beg to inform you that where it can be clearly shown
That genuine freedom of contract exists I am quite averse to State inter-
ference, so long as the contract in question may be either moral or legal. I
will never, however, be a party to wrong and injustice, however much the
banner of freedom of contract may be waved for the purpose of scaring
those who may wish to bring relief. The good of the State, in my opinion,
stands far above freedom of contract; and when these two forces clash, the
latter will have to submit. If you will study the course of legislation dur-
ing the last fifty years, you will find that the Tory party have interfered
with and restricted quite as largely freedom of contract as the Liberals
have done." 2 CHURCHILL, LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL (1906) 505.
60 Holmes, J. in Coppage v. Kansas, supra note 54, at 27, 35 Sup. Ct. at
248.
62 Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65
(1917); see Powell, loc. cit. supra note 54.
62 See Note (1928) 41 HARV. L. REV. 770; Carpenter, Interference with
Contract Relations (1928) 41 HAP.V. L. REv. 728.
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employed merely from day to day and not for a definite term.
This decision brought realization to employers that "yellow dog
contracts" had more than psychologic potency.03 The use of
these arrangements and their variants in the form of company
unions has spread widely and rapidly.0 ' Referred to as the
"American plan," the system covers nearly all the unorganized
coal fields in Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia and elsewhere.00
Recent hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee furnish
ample testimony that this movement is today among the most
active forces in large-scale industry.0
Such a challenge to organized labor was bound to arouse appeal
for legislative help. The first and thus far the only statutes do
not directly' outlaw "yellow dog contracts," but deny equitable
relief "in all cases involving the violation of a contract of em-
ployment . . where no irreparable damage is about to be com-
mitted upon the property or property rights." 0? In 1925 a bill
60 See Cochrane, Why Organized Labor is Fighting "Yellow Dog" Con-
tracts (1925) 15 Aiu. LAB. LEG. REV. 227-28, where it is said: "There is,
however, undoubtedly, a psychological effect upon some employees, par-
ticularly the ignorant or illiterate worker, when he affixes his signature and
his mark to a written agreement. He doesn't know what may not happen
if he even incurs the displeasure of his employer. To hirA it might involve
not only his being fired, but he might also be punished-perhaps fined and
imprisoned; and when there is included in the individual contract a clause
whereby the employee promises to have no dealings or talks with any one
in regard to union matters, the employer, playing upon the fears and ap-
prehensions of the ignorant man, finds that such contracts assist, perhaps
to a very marked degree, in not only keeping the union out, but keeping
the union at a distance. . . . There is, also, an effect upon intelligent trade-
union officials, for when they are notified by a firm's attorney that an effort
is being made to organize employees who have signed individual contracts,
the trade-union official cannot escape having in mind the possibility of in-
volved and costly court costs."
64 The President of the American Federation of Labor (Mr. Green) testi-
fled: "Ever since the Hitchman injunction case ... employers of labor
have been making what they term individual agreements with their em-
ployees. Those agreements usually provide that the employee will not join
a labor union while in the employ of the corporation .... along with the
individual contract there has developed the company union. . . . Usually
these company unions are organized and formed by some officer of the cor-
poration. These company unions in the General Electric, or the Pennsyl-
vania Railroad, upon transportation concerns, the Standard Oil, the steel
companies, and others have been inspired and developed by the companies
themselves." HEARINGS ON S. 1482, pp. 2, 87. See testimony as to specific
cases, ibid. 89-93, 662-69; (1920) 2 LAW AND LABOR 184, 188, 206. Cf. Stern,
A New Legal Problem in the Relations of Capital and Labor (1926) 74 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 523, which poses the question: Will the law uphold a con-
tract between a workman and his labor-union whereby he agrees for a
period of two years not to work in a non-union shop?
65 See HEARINGS ON CONDITIONS IN COAL FIELDS, 70th Cong., 1st Sess.
66 HEARINGS ON S. 1482, p. 628.
06 See N. D. ComP. LAWS ANN. (Supp. 1925) § 7214a3; WASH. COMP.
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sponsored by the Ohio State Federation of Labor, which provided
that such contracts are against public policy and void, did not get
beyond the lower House; within the next two years similar bills
presented in California, Illinois, and Massachusetts failed of pas-
sage.6 In the 1928 session of the New York legislature, such
a bill was pressed by the New York State Federation of Labor
but died in committee. We may be sure that this is only the be-
ginning of the agitation. Abatement of the present trend of
prosperity is likely to invigorate the demand for legislation.
LEGISLATION AFFECTING EQUITY JURISDICTION
Legislative revision of judicial doctrines of substantive law
proved, on the whole, futile. The influences that for a genera-
tion stimulated legislative easing of the sensitized contacts be-
tween law and labor therefore began to promote more concrete
measures of relief. They sought to meet specific complaints con-
cerning the equity process. The measures that were proposed
from time to time and frequently enacted had two main objec-
tives: to compress the scope of equitable jurisdiction in labor
controversies, and to correct procedural evils both in the manner
of granting the injunction and in the mode of its enforcement.
Proposals within the first category have the more spirited
legislative and judicial history.70 The three earlier statutes on
this phase of our problem and their judicial fate sufficiently tell
the tale. In 1903 a California statute not only eliminated as a
criminal offence a combination to do any act in furtherance of a
trade dispute, if such act would not be a crime when done by one
person alone, and excluded such a combination from the law
against restraint of trade, but went on to provide, "nor shall
any restraining order or injunction be issued with relation there-
STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 7613; ORE. LAWS (Olson, 1920) § 6815. The
latter two statutes are even more cautious than indicated, as they permit
equitable relief not only in case of "irreparable damage" to "property
rights" but also to "personal rights."
6s See (1925) 15 Am. LAB. LEG. Rnv. 227; (1927) 17 Am. LAB. LEG. REv.
142. The Ohio bill was deemed constitutional by the Attorney General of
that state, ibid 143-44.
69 Assembly Bill 562.
-0 Legislative measures to curb labor injunctions in Canadian provinces
are not within our immediate concern. As to them, see STEWAnT, CU,:AADL% N
LABOR LAWS AND THE TREATY (1926) 161. But the recent testimony of Mr.
Frey before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary is suggestive of the
reflex influence of the American experience upon labor disputes in Canada:
"There are some $3,500,000,000 of American capital invested in Canadian
industry. The attorneys for these American investors . .. acquaint...
[their Canadian attorneys] with the methods that they are able to apply
in American courts of equity... ." See, further, HEARINGS ON S. 1482,
pp. 656-57.
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to." 71 Claiming that defendants paraded in front of his place of
business with "unfair" and "don't patronize" placards to intimi-
date employees and patrons from entering his place of business,
a San Francisco employer applied to the state court for an in-
junction. The defendants relied upon the terms of the statute,
"nor shall any restraining order or injunction be issued." The
trial court issued an injunction which, with slight modifications,
the Supreme Court of California sustained.T2 Yet the statute
was not overlooked by the court nor was it found repugnant to
any constitutional provision. The statute was "construed":
"Appellants make the bare statement, without argument, that
'an injunction in this case is one also specifically forbidden by
Penal Code, page 581 . . .' but, in the first place, it cannot, in
our opinion, be construed as undertaking to prohibit a court from
enjoining the main wrongful acts, charged in the complaint in
this action; and, in the second place, if it could be so construed,
it would to that extent be void because violation of plaintiff's con-
stitutional right to acquire, possess, enjoy and protect prop-
erty. 3
In 1913 and 1914 two other states undertook more compre-
hensively to contract the jurisdiction of their equity courts. An
Arizona statute was the more elaborate. 74 It prohibited, first, its
courts from issuing injunctions "in any case between an em-
ployer and employees or between employers and employees ...
involving or growing out of a dispute concerning terms or con-
ditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable
injury to property . for which injury there is no adequate
remedy at law." Secondly, it enumerated particular acts that
no labor injunction might prescribe: ceasing work or inducing
others by peaceful means so to do; peaceful patrolling; ceasing
to patronize any party to a labor dispute or inducing others by
peaceful means so to do; payment of strike benefits; peaceable
assembly; the doing of, any act "which might lawfully be done
in the absence of such dispute by any party thereto."
Massachusetts followed the phrasing of the first part of the
Arizona statute verbatim, but added a stiffening provision in
order to eliminate the possibility of opening too wide the door
which by the permissive clause--"unless necessary to prevent
irreparable injury to property"-the Arizona statute left ajar.
It defined as follows what was not to be deemed property for
purposes of the statute:
71 CAL. STAT. AND AMEND. TO CODES (1903) 289; CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deer-
ing, 1923) act 1605.
72 Goldberg etc. Co. v. Stablemen's Union, 149 Cal. 429, 86 Pac. 806
(1906).
73 Ibid. 434, 86 Pac. at 808. Accord: Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal.
70, 103 Pac. 324 (1909).
7 ARZ. Civ. CODE (1913) par. 1464.
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"In construing this act the right to enter into the relation of
employer and employee, to change that relation, and to assume
and create a new relation for employer and employee, and to per-
form and carry on business in such relation with any person in
any place, or to do work and labor as an employee, shall be held
and construed to be a personal and not a property right." TS
"Recognizing every presumption in favor of the validity of
statutes enacted by the legislature," the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts found the enactment repugnant to the due proc-
ess clause of the federal Constitution and equivalent provisions
in the state constitution." In withdrawing the protection of
equitable remedies from the economic advantages of the em-
ployer-employee relationship, the legislation was held to have
annihilated the right to carry on business and to have deprived
those who possessed such rights from equal protection of the
laws. 7
The Arizona statute had a longer life. In the picturesque
mining town of Bisbee, Arizona, one Truax operated a restau-
rant. When he reduced the pay and increased the hours of his
employees, they struck, and, according to the findings of the trial
court, used these means to succeed:
". .. advertising the existence of the strike by the display of
banners, by pickets and the distribution of circulars and loud
talking on the streets. The facts advertised . . . are that a
strike against the English Kitchen existed; that the said strike
was declared and maintained by the defendant union; that the
English Kitchen proprietors are 'unfair' to organized labor, be-
cause said proprietors have refused to grant union employees
fair wages and fair working hours..." 7
75 Mass. Acts 1914, c. 778, § 2, reprinted in Bogni v. Perotti, 224 Mass.
152, 153, 112 N. E. 853, 855 (1916). See the comment of former President
Taft in (1914) 39 A. B. A. REP. 359, 372, speaking of the Massachusetts
Act (subsequently held invalid): "One feels in respect to such an enact-
ment by the conservative, law-abiding Old Bay State, which loves equality
and properly prides itself as a government of laws and not men, as the
author of the Biglow Papers did with reference to her attitude in the Mexi-
can War, when he said: "Massachusetts, God forgive her, is a-kneelin'
with the rest.'"
7 Bogni v. Perotti, supra note 75. The case is discussed in (1920) 20
COL. L. REv. 696; (1916) 30 HARv. L. REV. 75. In SENATE HARUNGS ON S.
1482, p. 294, W. G. Merritt testified concerning this decision: "That deci-
sion naturally stirred up a great deal of excitement, because it was con-
trary to what organized labor believed the law to be, and editorials were
-written by the Federationist, such as: 'Americans, wake up! What shall
be done with judges who violate the constitutional rights of labor? Massa-
chusetts court filches labor's rights."'
77 A statute almost identical with that of Massachusetts was enacted in
Minnesota in 1917, MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 4258. It has not yet
apparently been subjected to review by an appellate court. So also, Ou
LAws (Olson, 1920) § 6817.78 Truax v. Bisbee Local No. 380, 19 Ariz. 379, 389, 171 Pae. 121, 125
(1918).
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The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed dismissal of injunction
proceedings against the union and based its decision largely upon
the Arizona statute. Peaceful picketing, according to the court,
was thereby legalized. Whether picketing is peaceful or not was
a question of fact, and when the trial court had determined that
picketing in a particular strike was peaceful, no injunction could
issue to restrain it. Truax forthwith began a new suit, this time
including as defendants some of the strikers individually as well
as their union. The complaint repeated the allegations, of the
prior action and was again dismissed. On appeal only one ques-
tion was presented-"the constitutionality of Paragraph 1464 of
the Civil Code of Arizona of 1913"-and that was decided in
favor of the validity of the statute.9 The court bluntly admitted
that the strike tactics were hurting the plaintiff's business, but
concluded that the very purpose of the statute was to prevent
enjoining such tactics and "to recognize the right of workmen
or strikers to use peaceable means to accomplish the lawful ends
for which the strike was called." 80 The Supreme Court of Ari-
zona was the only court in 1918 that at once respected the aim
of this type of legislation and found in its application no in-
fringement of constitutional guarantees. The subsequent fate
of the Arizona statute is entwined with the history of kindred
national legislation. The explanation of Mr. Truax's final tri-
umph in the Supreme Court of the United States will seem
clearer after a recital of the history of this federal legislation.
Congressional efforts to cut down the equity jurisdiction of
federal courts in labor controversies followed the Debs case. At
the turn of the present century, a bill before the House to limit
the meaning of the word "conspiracy" and partially withdraw-
ing trade disputes from the scope of the Sherman Law contained
the clause "nor shall any restraining order or injunction be is-
sued in relation thereto." 81 The next year a bill with the iden-
tical clause passed the House.2 In the next two Congresses like
measures were proposed but without effect 83 In 1906, the Amer-
ican Federation of Labor addressed to the President, the Presi-
dent of the Senate and the Speaker of the House what was called
a " Bill of Grievances," setting forth in part the following:
79 Truax v. Corrigan, 20 Ariz. 7, 176 Pac. 570 (1918).
80 Ibid. 11, 176 Pac. at 572.
81 H. R. 8917, S. 4233, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. The bill will be found in 34
CONG. REc. 2589-90 (1901). A provision, added by the Committee, read:
"Provided, That the provisions of this act shall not apply to threats to
injure the person or the property, business, or occupation of any person
... to intimidation or coercion, or to any acts causing or intended to cause
an illegal interference, by overt acts, with the rights of others." The bill
thereupon was defeated upon the insistence of labor leaders themselves.
82 H. R. 11060, 35 CONG. REC. 4995 (1902).
83H. R. 4445, 58th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. 6782, H. R. 8136, 58th Cong.,
2d Sess.
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"The beneficent writ of injunction intended to protect prop-
erty rights has, as used in labor disputes, been perverted so as
to attack and destroy personal freedom, and in a manner to hold
that the employer has some property rights in the labor of the
workmen. Instead of obtaining the relief which labor has sought
it is seriously threatened with statutory authority for existingjudicial usurpation." ,4
Not less than nineteen bills were introduced in the House and
Senate of the Sixtieth Congress. The most significant of these,
in view of later developments, was a bill introduced by Mr.
Pearre, a Republican Congressman from laryland.8  He pro-
posed a complete departure from earlier attempts at reform.
Assuming that equity jurisdiction was coterminous with the
protection of "property," the Pearre Bill proposed to circum-
scribe equity by so defining the concept "property" as to exclude
the interests that are involved in a labor dispute. After forbid-
ding any federal judge to issue an injunction in any labor dis-
pute, except to prevent irreparable injury to property, the Pearre
Bill provided that
. . .for the purposes of this Act, no right to continue the re-
lation of employer and employee or to assume or create such
relation with any particular person or persons, or at all, or to
carry on business of any particular kind, or at any particular
place, or at all, shall be construed, held, considered or treated as
property or as constituting a property right." 81
This bill had scarcely been referred to the House Judiciary Com-
mittee when President Roosevelt sent a special message to Con-
gress "again" calling its attention "to the need of some action
in connection with the abuse of injunctions in labor cases":
"It is all wrong to use the injunction to prevent the entirely
proper and legitimate actions of labor oganizations in their
struggle for industrial betterment, or under the guise of protect-
ing property rights unwarrantably to invade the fundamental
rights of the individual. It is futile to concede, as we all do, the
right and necessity of organized effort on the part of wage earn-
84 Reprinted in toto in 51 CONG. REC. 16337 (1914). See McMahon, Re-
view of Platforms Put Forth by the Amcrican Federation of Labor (1920)
65 Onio L. BULL. 67; FREY, LABoR INJUNCTION 91.
85 H. R. 94, 42 CONG. REC. 13 (1907).
86 At a hearing before the House Committee on Judiciary, the counsel for
the American Federation of Labor on Feb. 5, 1908, stated: "The bill was
considered by at least two sessions of the executive council of that organi-
zation and unanimously approved. It was considered by two of its national
conventions-the two latest-and by these unanimously indorsed .... the
organization has stood by and is to-day standing by this bill without amend-
ments." Mr. Gompers before the same Committee, on Feb. 28, 1908, said:
"Events have demonstrated clearly to my mind that there is only one bill
before the committee that can at all be effective to deal with this abuse,
with this invasion of human rights, and that is the Pearre bill."
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ers and yet by injunctive process to forbid peaceable action to
accomplish the lawful objects for which they are organized and
upon which their success depends." 87
Despite this message and the many bills, the Sixtieth Congress
closed without action. That year, 1908, the national conventions
were meeting. The Republican platform 88 recognized defects in
the procedure leading to injunctions. A broader, if vaguer,
paragraph in the Democratic platform 80 was interpreted by Mr.
Gompers as an endorsement of the Pearre Bill. 0 In a character-
istic public letter, two weeks before the election President Roose-
velt assailed the Pearre Bill:
"I denounce as wicked the proposition to secure a law which,
according to the explicit statement of Mr. Gompers, is to prevent
the courts from effectively interfering with riotous violence
where the object is to destroy a business, and which will legalize
a blacklist and the secondary boycott, both of them the apt instru-
ments of unmanly persecution." 01
In the first Congress of President Taft's administration
twelve bills were introduced seeking modifications of the existing
procedure governing labor injunctions. Not one was reported
out of committee. Two years later, however, politics were in the
lively current of the "Progressive movement" and in the Sixty-
second Congress began the steady drive that three years later
eventuated in the Clayton Act. The House Judiciary Committee,
in January 1912, opened hearings on injunctive legislation, con-
sidering eleven specific bills then pending. 2  The most active
measure was the Wilson Bill,93 identical with the Pearre Bill of
the Sixtieth Congress in purpose, scheme and, for the greater
part, in language. Like the Pearre Bill, it forbade the issuance
of injunctions in labor disputes, except to prevent irreparable
injury to property, defining "property" thus:
"And for the purpose of this Act no right to continue the
relation of employer and employee, or to assume or create such
87 42 CONG. REC. 1347-48 (1908).
8 8 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTEENTH REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION
(1908).
89 "Questions of judicial practice have arisen especially in connection with
industrial disputes. We deem that the parties to all judicial proceedings
should be treated with rigid impartiality, and that injunctions should not
be issued in any cases in which injunctions would not issue if no industrial
dispute were involved." PROCEEDINGS OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CON-
VENTION (1908) 168.
9 0 HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, INJUNC-
TIONS (1912) 62d Cong., 2d Sess. pp. 269-70.
91 This letter is reprinted, ibid. 264. Mr. Gompers' reply appears ibid.
pp. 272-75.
92 Supra note 90.
93 H. R. 11032, 62d Cong., 1st Sess.
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relation with any particular person or persons, or at all, or
patronage or good-will in business, or buying or selling commodi-
ties of any particular kind or at any particular place, or at all,
shall be construed, held, considered, or treated as property or
as constituting a property right." 14
The American Federation of Labor urged this bill on President
and Congress25  But after extended hearings, the House Com-
mittee wholly recast.the Wilson Bill, and reported out a new
series of proposals Or which were destined to become the bases
of the labor provisions in the Clayton Act. The course of the
debates on these proposals and their vicissitudes, covering a
period of over two years from first presentation to the House
until final passage by both chambers, is more than historic curio.
It is essential to an understanding of the decisions that applied
the Clayton Act.
94 See Mr. Andrew Furuseth's testimony at the House Hearings, supra
note 90 at 110: "What labor is now seeldng is the assistance of all liberty-
loving men in restoring the common-law definition of property and in re-
tricting the jurisdiction of the equity courts in that connection to what it
was at the time of the adoption of the Constitution."
Daniel Davenport, general counsel of the American Antiboycott Associa-
tion, in testifying before the committee: "To say that Congress can de-
clare by statute that not to be property which the uniform decisions of in-
numerable courts have declared to be property, which the Supreme Court
itself has so declared, and which the common sense of manldnd instinctively
recognized as property, and by so declaring it not to be property to with-
draw it from the protection of the processes of law which this bill itself
preserves for the protection of all other property is simple nonsense. I say
it is useless to spend time in discussing it." Ibid. 294-95.
95 See HOUSE HEARINGS, supra note 90, at 11. The American Federation
Convention of 1911 adopted by unanimous vote the following recommenda-
tions: "We recommend that this convention authorize and direct the ex-
ecutive council to urge the President of the United States to recommend
in his forthcoming message to Congress the amendment of the Sherman
antitrust law upon the lines as contained in the Wilson bill; and further,
that the executive council be and it is hereby, directed, either as a body
or by the selection of a committee thereof, to interview and confer with
the President in furtherance of the purpose of this report; and the execu-
tive council is hereby further authorized and directed to take such further
action as its judgment may warrant to secure the enactment of such legis-
lation at the following session of Congress as shall secure the legal status
of the organized movement of the wage workers and its freedom from un-
just discrimination in the exercise of their necessary, normal, and con-
stitutional rights through their voluntary associations; and the executive
council is further authorized and directed, that, in the event of failure on
the part of Congress to enact the legislation which we herein seek at the
hands of Congress and the President, to take such action as in its judg-
ment the situation may warrant in the presidential and congressional elec-
tion of 1912." Reprinted ibid. 94.
96 H. R. 23635, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., reported out April 27, 1912 (48
CONG. REC. 5514) accompanied by H. Rep. No. 612 and a minority report,
H. Rep. 612, pt. 2. The majority report will be found reprinted in 48
CONG. REc. 6458 (1912) ; the minority report, ibid. 6443.
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The first three sections of the new bill were regulatory of
procedure governing the injunction and the ex parte restraining
order; these we treat later. Our immediate concern is with the
fourth and last section, made up of two paragraphs. The first
forbade federal judges from granting an injunction
. . . in any case between an employer and employees, or
between employers and employees, or between employees, or be-
tween persons employed and persons seeking employment, involv-
ing or growing out of a dispute concerning terms or conditions
of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury
to property or to a property right. . .
The bill carried no definition of "property." The second para-
graph took a new tack. It catalogued specific acts for which no
injunction could issue: terminating employment or persuading
others by lawful means so to do; peacefully obtaining or com-
municating information; ceasing to patronize or to employ any
party to such dispute or persuading others by peaceful means
so to do; paying strike benefits; peaceable assembly in a lawful
manner for lawful purposes; "doing any act or thing which
might lawfully be done in the absence of such dispute by any
party thereto." 9 7
The purpose of the bill was set forth in the majority report
of the House Judiciary Committee:
"The second paragraph of section 266c is concerned with spe-
cific acts which the best opinion of the courts holds to be within
the right of parties involved upon one side or the other of a
97 This paragraph read as follows: "And no such restraining order or
injunction shall prohibit any person or persons from terminating any re-
lation of employment, or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or
from recommending, advising or persuading others by peaceful means so
to do; or from attending at or near a house or place where any person
resides or works, or carries on business, or happens to be for the purpose
of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or of peacefully
persuading any person to work or to abstain from working; or from ceasing
to patronize or to employ any party to such dispute, or from recommend-
ing, advising, or persuading others by peaceful means so to do; or from
paying or giving to or withholding from any person engaged in such dis-
pute any strike benefits or other moneys or things of value; or from peace-
ably assembling at any place in a lawful manner and for lawful purposes;
or from doing any act or thing which might lawfully be done in the ab-
sence of such dispute by any party thereto." Reprinted in 48 CoNG. REO.
6415 (1912) as H. R. 23635.
The second clause was taken from the British Trade Disputes Act of
1906, the second section of which provided: "It shall be lawful for one or
more persons . . .in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, to
attend at or near a house or place where a person resides or works or car-
ries on business or happens to be, if they so attend merely for the purpose
of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or of peacefully
persuading any person to work or abstain from working."
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trades dispute. The necessity for legislation concerning them
arises out of the divergent views which the courts have expressed
on the subject and the difference between courts in the applica-
tion of recognized rules." 9
Contrariwise, the minority report contended that the second
paragraph was "the most vicious proposal of the whole bill," 00
because it authorized the specified conduct regardless of actuat-
ing motives. The debate on the floor of the House followed the
lines of these reports. The opposition was summarized by Mr.
Mloon of Pennsylvania:
"The obvious purpose of this paragraph, Mr. Speaker, is to
legalize the moderm strike and secondary boycott as instruments
of industrial warfare, and to place the destructive machinery of
these dangerous and cunningly devised weapons beyond the pre-
ventive power of our courts of justice." 210
The ablest speech was by John W. Davis, then a member for
West Virginia, who supported the bill as an "effort to crystallize
into law the best opinions of the best courts." 2", On May 14,
1912, the bill passed the House as reported.1"0- It duly came
before the Senate Judiciary Committee which began hearings
the month following, continuing intermittently until February
of the next year.13 Despite much prodding on the floor of
the Senate,-M the bill never emerged from the legislative
"morgue." 105
The next Congress ushered in the Wilson era on Capitol Hill as
well as at the White House. In the spring of 1914, the chair-
man of its Judiciary Committee, Mr. Clayton, reported to the
House 06 a bill (H. R. 15657)--"To supplement existing laws
against unlawful restraints and monopolies, and for other pur-
poses"-Section 18 10- of which was the exact replica of the bill
9s H. Rep. No. 612, 62d Cong., 2d Sess.; 48 CONG. REC. 6458 (1912).
99 H. Rep. No. 612, pt. 2, 62d Cong., 2d Sess.; 48 CONG. REC. 6443
(1912).
1 48 CoNG. REC. 6421 (1912).
101 Ibid. 6438.
10248 CoNG. REC. 6470-71 (1912) ; referred to Senate Committee on Judici-
ary, ibid. 6477.
103 HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE COMMIT=- O THEF
JUDICuIRy, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. on H. R. 23635 (1912).
1(14 Motions to discharge the committee from further consideration of the
bill were made repeatedly, 48 CONG. REC. 7986, 7987, 8118, 8224, 8246
(1912); 49 CONG. REc. 2685, 2686 (1913). The Senate at this time was
Republican, the House was Democratic. See 51 CONG. REC. 9272 (1914).
133 51 CONG. REC. 9272 (1914).
106 H. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany H. R. 15657; 51
CONG. REC. 8200 (1914).
107 Reprinted in 51 CONG. REC. 9611 (1914).
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passed in the previous House. One amendment only was pro-
posed by the committee: following the catalogue of specific
acts that were not to be enjoined, these words were added-
"nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be con-
sidered or held unlawful." 1108
The section produced a cross-fire of opposition -"nothing
whatsoever for labor's benefit" would be accomplished because it
was operative only between an employer and employees, a rela-
tionship that terminated in case of strike or lockout; 'll too much
was accomplished because prohibition of injunctions against
"ceasing to patronize . . or persuading others by peaceful
means so to do" legalized the secondary boycott.10 The argu-
ment in support of the section was briefly that "everything set
forth in section 18 is the law to-day" -' and that the section was
not intended to legalize the secondary boycott.12
We have already had occasion to note the diversity of mean-
ings which has over-laid the label "secondary boycott." "I The
108 51 CoNG. REC. 9652 (1914). Mr. Webb's explanation follows: ".
having recognized and legalized the acts set forth in section 18, so far as
the conscience side of the court is concerned, the committee feels that no
harm can come from making those acts legal on the law side of the court,
for anything that is permitted to be done in conscience ought not be made
a crime or forbidden in law." Ibid. 9653.
209 Mr. Madden, 51 CONG. REG. 9082 (1914). This argument was made
many times, 51 CONG. REC. 9654-55. Mr. Murdock of Kansas framed the
difficulty in this way: "The gentleman . . . knows that under this para-
graph there are several kinds of classes to which tre granted exemption;
that is, cases between employer and employees, between employers and em-
ployees, and between two sets of employees, and between persons employed
and persons seeking employment; but none of these classes of cases, to my
mind, include strikers. And it was the strike which caused this proposi-
tion to be offered." Mr. Floyd of Arkansas answered as follows: "I can
not agree with the gentleman from Kansas that when strikers temporarily
quit work, demanding better terms and conditions before they resume, that
the relation of employer and employee has ceased. It may have ceased
temporarily, but this broad language used in the provision would undoubtedly
include them." Ibid. 9655. Mr. Madden of Illinois said: "And when any-
one argues that the words 'employer and employees' will be held to mean
those previously holding the relation, the courts will refuse to so radically
change and extend the meaning." Ibid. 9496.
110 51 CONG. REC. 9652, 9658 (1914). Mr. Moon of Pennsylvania, from
the House Committee on the Judiciary (H. Rep. 612, pt. 2, 62d Cong., 2d
Sess.) submitted the following as the views of the minority: ". . . this
section would prevent the issuance of the injunction in the Debs case (In
re Debs, 158 U. S. 564) ; it would prevent the issuance of the injunction in
Toledo & Ann Arbor v. Pennsylvania Co. (54 Fed. 730); it would prevent
the issuance of any injunction to restrain either workmen or employers
who were the objects of the most vicious form of boycott that has been
passed upon by the courts, or can be devised by the ingenuity of boycotters."
111 51 CONG. REC. 9653 (1914).
1-12 Ibid. 9652-53, 9658.
213 Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit. supra note 4, at 195.
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debates on this measure illustrate these accretions of ambiguity.
The leaders on both sides, Mr. Webb in support, and Mr. Volstead
in opposition, were in accord in their abhorrence of a "secondary
boycott." But while the latter rhetorically asked "can it be
questioned that . . it [Section 18 as amended] will legalize
the secondary boycott?" 114 the former was so "perfectly satis-
fied" that the section did not authorize the secondary boycott,
that he declined to accept an amendment further to clarify the
point.1115 The statute itself scrupulously avoided the words "sec-
ondary boycott" which would unavoidably have imported am-
biguity. The language used was descriptive of conduct, and not
a phrase that to many inevitably conveyed the significance of
illegality."6
The bill, as amended, passed the House on June 5, 1914,227 was
promptly referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, reported
out on July 22, 1914,118 and with some literary modifications ,-'
14 51 CONG. REC. 9658 (1914).
1'5 Ibid. The same difficulties and confusion prevailed in the Senate, ibid.
15945. Mr. Albert H. Walker of New York, testifying before a subcom-
mittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, supra note 103, at 031:
"Chairman. The binl as I read it, does not exempt the so-called secondary
boycott from injunctions.
Mr. Walker. I think it does.
Chairman. Where it says: No such restraining order or injunction shall
prohibit any person or persons from ceasing to patronize or to employ any
party to such dispute.
Mr. Walker. But to go to the last words of the sentence, 'or from doing
any act or thing which might lawfully be done in the absence of such dis-
pute by any party thereto,' that covers secondary boycotting like a blanket
and exempts it from injunctions."
116 The clause "ceasing to patronize or advising others by peaceful means
so to do," Mr. Webb thus interpreted: "... it does authorize persons to
cease to patronize the party to the dispute and to recommend others to cease
to patronize that same party to the dispute .... we confine the boycotting
to the parties to the dispute, allowing parties to cease to patronize that
party and to ask others to cease to patronize the party to the dispute." 51
CONG. REC. 9658 (1914).
"1 Ibid. 9911.
'118 Ibid. 12468.
119 These changes were made: (1) To the privilege of terminating em-
ployment was added the phrase "whether singly or in concert." 51 CoN;G.
REc. 14330 (1914). (2) The clause specifying unenjoinable conduct-
"attending at or near a house or place where any person resides or works
or carries on business or happens to be, for the purpose of peacefully ob-
taining or communicating information" was dropped, ibid. 14330, and later
replaced by this clause: "attending at any place where any such person or
persons may lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or com-
municating information, or from peacefully persuading any person to work
or to abstain from working." (3) "ceasing to patronize ... or persuading
others by peaceful means so to do" changed to include the words "and law-
ful" after "peaceful." Ibid. 14331. (4) "peaceably assembling at any
place" changed by dropping the words "at any place." Ibid. 14331. (5)
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was adopted by the Senate, September 2, 1914.120 The conference
of the two Houses submitted their report, 21 which was accepted
by the Senate, October 5, 1914 122 and by the House three days
later.123 By President Wilson's signature on October 15, 1914,
the measure known to history as the Clayton Act became law.124
This completes in barest outline a sketch of legislative pro-
posals to curb equity jurisdiction which, from 1894 to 1914,
engaged the attention of every congressional session but one.
If such continuous effort and travail in the evolution of a single
measure 125 express any responsible purpose, they must justify
The provision that none of the specifically unenjoinable conduct shall be
held "unlawful" was changed by adding after the word "unlawful," "under
the laws of any State in which the act was committed." Ibid. 14367. This
was eventually modified to read: "shall . . . be considered or held to be
violations of any law of the United States."
12051 CONG. REC. 14610 (1914).
121 SEN. Doc. No. 585, reprinted ibid. 15637.
122 Ibid. 16170.
123 Ibid. 16344.
124 Section 20 of this Act (now 29 U. S. C. § 52 (1926) ) reads as follows:
"No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the
United States, or a judge or the judges thereof, iA any case between an
employer and employees, or between employers and employees, or between
employees, or between persons employed and persons seehing employment,
involving or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of
employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property,
or to a property right, of the party making the application, for which
injury there is no adequate remedy at law, and such property or property
right must be described with particularity in the application, which must
be in writing and sworn to by the applicant or by his agent or attorney.
"And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or
persons, whether singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of
employment, or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from
recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful means so to do;
or from attending at any place where any such person or persons may
lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating
information, or from peacefully persuading any person to work or to
abstain from working; or from ceasing to patronize or to employ any party
to such dispute, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by
peaceful and lawful means so to do; or from paying or giving to, or
withholding from, any persons engaged in such dispute, any strike benefits
or other moneys or'things of value; or from peaceably assembling in a
lawful manner, and for lawful purposes; or from doing any act or thing
which might lawfully be done in the absence of such dispute by any party
thereto; nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered
or held to be violations of any law of the United States. (Oct. 15, 1914, c.
323 § 20, 38 Stat. 738)."
125 We take the following summary of references to congressional debates
and hearings from Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Truax v.
Corrigan, supra note 12, at 369, n. 39, 42 Sup. Ct. at 143, n. 39: "53d
Congress: resolutions to investigate the use of the injunction in certain
cases, 26 CONG. REC. 2466; 56th Congress: debate, 34 CONG. REc. 2589;
60th Congress: hearings, SEN. Doec. 525; special message of the President.
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the presumption that Congress was long conscious of abuses in
issuing injunctions and that this legislation embodied a solu-
tion.12c Five days after its enactment, however, the then Presi-
dent of the American Bar Association, in his annual address,
gave warning of impending pitfalls:
"All these provisions have been called the charter of liberty
of labor. We have seen that the changes from existing law they
make are not broadly radical and that most of them are declara-
tory merely of what would be law without the statute. This is
a useful statute in definitely regulating procedure in injunctions
and in express definition of what may be done in labor disputes.
But what I fear is that when the statute is construed by the
courts it will keep the promise of the labor leaders to the ear
and break it to the hope of the ranks of labor." 12"
This prophet was himself destined to be Chief Justice of the
Court that gave final meaning to the Clayton Act and determined
the limits of legislative power in prescribing remedies for injunc-
tive abuses.
SEN. Doc. 213, 42 CONG. REC. 1347; papers relating to injunctions in labor
Cases, SEN. Docs. 504 and 524; 61st Congress: debate, 45 CoNG. REc. "4t;
62d Congress: debate, 43 CONG. REC. 6415-6470; hearings, SE.N. Doec. 944;
petitions, SEN. Doec. 440; hearings before the House Committee on the
Judiciary, Jan. 11, 17-19, February 8, 14, 1912; hearings before a subcom-
mittee of Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 62d Congress, 2d Ses-.;
63d Congress, see debates on H. R. 15657 (the Clayton Act)."
2-6 JudgeAmidon drew the following comparison between § 20 of the
Clayton Act and § 2 of the English Trade Disputes Act of 1900: "The
form in which they are framed differs, but their legal effect is the same.
The English statute says that 'it shall be lawful' to do the specific acts
mentioned in each of the statutes. This, as a necessary inference, forbade
the courts to issue injunctions restraining workmen from doing those acts.
The American statute reverses this order. It expressly forbids courts to
issue injunctions or restraining orders forbidding workmen to do the acts
specified in section 20, and then in its last clause declares as follows: 'Nor
shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held to
be violations of any law of the United States.' Our statute forbids express-
ly the issuing of injunctions against the doing of the acts, and also declares
that the doing of the same shall not be construed or held to be a violation
of federal law. The English act, without ex-pressly dealing with the subject
by forbidding injunctions, does so impliedly by conferring upon employs
in the ease of a trade dispute the right to do the acts. The only difference
in the two statutes is that our law is express on the subject of forbidding
injunctions in the cases specified, while the English statute accomplishes
the same result by implication." Great Northern Ry. v. Brosseau, 286 Fed.
414, 417 (D. N. D. 1923).
-7 (1914) 39 A. B. A. REP. 359, 380. Other discussions of the Act prior
to any judicial construction are the following: Davenport, A7n Analyasi of
the Labor Sections of the Clayton Anti-Trust Bill (1915) 80 CEN-T. L. J.
46; Witte, The Doctrine that Labor is a Commodity (1917) 69 Am. ACA-
DEMY OF POL. & Soc. SCL ANN. 133; The Clayton Bill and Organized
Labor (1914) 32 SuRvn 360; Note (1917) 30 HARY. L. REv. 632.
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Between 1916 and 1920, in thirteen cases 128 in which opinions
are reported, lower federal courts applied Section 20 of the
Clayton Act. In ten of these cases, the statute was held not to
stand in the way of an injunction. This surprising result was
based on two independent and inconsistent constructions. First,
that Section 20 did not change the pre-existing law; 12 second,
that the section did create new privileges, but extremely limited
in scope. Thus, the statute was held inapplicable when the pur-
pose of the strike was other than immediate betterment of work-
ing conditions: to unionize a factory, to refuse to work upon
non-union products was deemed a strike "for a whim," not
sheltered by the Clayton Act and subjecting the defendants to
"those settled principles respecting organized picketing." 130
Again, the Act could not be invoked when once the employer
had refilled vacancies: persons who continued to strike and
picket thereafter were no longer "employees" protected by the
Clayton Act.'3 1 Finally, hostility to all picketing was too deeply
ingrained in the mental habits of some of the federal judges to
yield to the language of the Clayton Act. Instead, it continued
to supply a canon of interpretation. 132 An attitude derived from
assumptions like this--"practical people question the possibility
of peaceful persuasion through the practice of picketing" 1-
found no difficulty in clothing every reasonably effective strike
activity in language synonymous with illegality.1 34
128 Alaska S. S. Co. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 236 Fed. 964
(D. Wash. 1916); Tri-City Cent. T. Council v. American Steel Foundries,
238 Fed. 728 (C. C. A. 7th, 1916); Stephens v. Ohio State Telephone Co.,
240 Fed. 759 (N. D. Ohio, 1917); Kroger Grocery & B. Co. v. Retail Clerks'
I. P. Ass'n, 250 Fed. 890 (D. Mo. 1918); Montgomery v. Pacific Electric
Ry., 258 Fed. 382 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919); Dail-Overland Co. v. Willys-
Overland, 263 Fed. 171 (N. D. Ohio, 1920); Vonnegut Machinery Co. v.
Toledo Machine & Tool Co., 263 Fed. 192 (D. Ohio, 1920); Langenborg
Hat Co. v. United Cloth Hat and Cap Makers, 266 Fed. 127 (D. Mo. 1920);
King v. Weiss & Lesh Mfg. Co., 266 Fed. 257 (C. C. A. 6th, 1920);
Herkert & Meisel T. Co. v. United Leatherworkers' I. U., 268 Fed. 662
(E. D. Mo. 1920). The cases in which the injunction was denied: Puget
Sound Traction Light & Power Co. v. Whitley, 243 Fed. 945 (W. D. Wash.
1917); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 247 Fed. 192 (S. D. N. Y.
1917); Kinloch Telephone Co. v. Local Union No. 2, 265 Fed. 312 (E. D.
Mo. 1920).
1) Stephens v. Ohio State Telephone Co., supra note 128.
130 Vonnegut Machinery Co. v. Toledo Machine & Tool Co., supra note
128, at 201-03.
13, Dail-Overland Co. v. Willys-Overland, supra note 128.
132 As to the attitude of courts generally towards legislation, see Pound,
Common Law and Legislation (1908) 21 HARV. L. Rv. 383.
133 Vonnegut Machinery Co. v. Toledo Machine & Tool Co., supra note 128.
134 See Montgomery v. Pacific Electric Ry.; Vonnegut Machinery Co.
v. Toledo Machine & Tool Co.; Langenberg Hat Co. v. United Cloth Hat
and Cap Makers, all supra note 128.
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Not until 1921 13 did litigation reach the Supreme Court call-
ing for its pronouncement upon the Clayton Act. But in June
of 1917, the intimation of Mr. Justice Holmes in Paine Lzmzbcr
Company v. Neal,-c0 and a dissenting opinion in that case, fore-
shadowed the Court's construction of the Act. Because the
material manufactured by plaintiffs was not made by union labor,
defendant unions (whose members, however, were not in plain-
tiff's employ) refused to work upon it. To restrain their conduct,
plaintiffs sought an action against them. Disagreeing with the
majority of the Court that the Clayton Act was inapplicable
because the litigation antedated it, the dissenting Justices argued
that an injunction should issue because they did not find "in
§ 20 of the Clayton Act anything interfering with the right of
the complainants to an injunction." 137 This opinion yielded to
the reasoning we have just summarized from the opinions in
the lower federal courts: the section did not apply because there
was no relation of employer and employee between the parties
in the case, and because there was no dispute between them as
to conditions of employment; the section only sanctioned "law-
ful" measures-"that is, of course, measures that were lawful
before the Act." 138 These views were transmuted into decisions
in two cases which fixed the meaning of Section 20.120
In Duplex Printing Co. v. Deerig, an injunction was sought
to restrain the Machinists' and affiliated unions from interfering
with plaintiff's business by inducing their members not to work
for the Duplex Company, or its customers, in connection with
the hauling, installation and repair of printing presses made by
the Company.' 0  There was a strike pending against the Com-
pany to secure the closed shop, an eight-hour day, and a union
scale of wages. The late Judge Hough's decision dismissing the
bill 14- was affirmed by a majority of the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. 42- Judge Hough was clear that Section
13 Duplex Co. v. Deering, sztpra note 51.
136 Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, supra note 47.
137 Ibid. 484, 37 Sup. Ct. at 725.
138 Ibid. 485, 37 Sup. Ct. at 725.
39 The Hitchman Coal Company Case, suipra note 61, decided Dec. 10,
1917, did not consider at all the applicability of the Clayton Act since the
final decree had issued Jan. 18, 1913 (202 Fed. 512 (N. D. W. Va.)). See
Kroger Grocery & B. Co. v. Retail Clerks' Ass'n; Kinloch Telephone Co. v.
Local Union No. 2, both supra note 128. But cf. Montgomery v. Pacific
Electric Ry. Co., supra note 128, at 388-89.
140 The conduct of the union is detailed fully in the opinion of the trial
court, 247 Fed. 192 (D. N. Y. 1917), and in the opinion of Judge Rogers,
on appeal, 252 Fed. 722 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918). It must be remembered
that counsel for the plaintiff requested the court not to consider any evidence
of violence or threats of violence in deciding upon the legality of the
defendants' conduct. Ibd. 746.
141 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 247 Fed. 192 (D. N. Y. 1917).
'2 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 252 Fed. 722 (C. C. A. 2d,
1918).
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20, if applicable to the litigation, forbade the issue of an injunc-
tion. His only doubt was as to the applicability of the section:
"Is the present litigation one between employers and employes
or an employer and employ6s, growing out of a dispute concern-
ing terms or conditions of employment?" 143 He so held. There
was a dispute; it concerned conditions of labor; it was a dispute
between employer and employees, although only "a dozen or so"
of the plaintiff's own employees were on strike. "In strict
truth," wrote Judge Hough,
s. . .this is a dispute between two masters, the union, or
social master, and the paymaster; but, unless the words 'employ-
ers and employees', as ordinarily used, and used in this statute,
are to be given a strained and unusual meaning, they must refer
to the business class or clan to which the parties litigant respec-
tively belong." 144
Meaning that to Judge Hough was "strained and unusual" a
majority of the Supreme Court found easy and obvious, and all
his conclusions were rejected.1 45  Their reasoning took this
course: irreparable injury "to property or to a property right"
includes injury to an employer's business; the privileges of Sec-
tion 20 did not extend to defendants who had never been in the
relationship of employee to the plaintiff or sought employment
with him, because it did not apply "beyond the parties affected
in a proximate and substantial, not merely a sentimental or
sympathetic, sense by the cause of the dispute"; 140 furthermore,
analyzing the specific exemption invoked 147.-"ceasing to patron-
ize. . or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means
so to do"-the Court concluded that the instigation of a strike
against an employer who was at peace with his own employees,
solely to compel such employer to withdraw his patronage from
the plaintiff with whom there was a dispute "cannot be deemed
peaceful and lawful persuasion." 118 The dissenting opinion of
143 Ibid. 747.
144Ibid. 748. The majority opinion of the Supreme Court answered the
point as follows: "We deem this construction altogether inadmissible....
Congress had in mind particular industrial controversies, not a general
class war." Duplex Co. v. Deering, supra note 51, at 471-72, 41 Sup. Ct.
at 178.
145Ibid. Pitney, J. wrote the majority opinion, which was concurred in
by White, C. J., McKenna, Day, Van Devanter, McReynolds, JJ. Brandeis,
J. wrote the dissenting opinion, which was concurred in by Holmes and
Clark, JJ. The case is considered in (1921) 34 HARV. L. REV. 880; MASON,
ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE LAW (1925) 203 et seq.; Sayre, The Claytol
Act Construed (1921) 45 SURVEY 597.
146 Duplex Co. v. Deering, supra note 51, at 472, 41 Sup. Ct. at 178.
147 See Powell, The Supreme Court's Control over the Issue of Injunc-
tions in Labor Disputes (1928) 13 ACADEMY OF POL. SCi. PRoc. 37, 51.
148 It is of significance that Mr. Justice Pitney misquoted the pertinent
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Mr. Justice Brandeis (in which Holmes and Clarke, JJ. con-
curred) refused to confine the scope of the exemptions of Section
20 merely within the area of a legal relationship between a
specific employer and his employees, both by reason of the word-
ing of the statute and by virtue of the fact that "the very acts
to which it applies severed the continuity of the legal relation-
ship." 149 Finding that the economic relation of the parties
brought them within Section 20, the dissenting Justices con-
cluded that it did exempt from injunctive process instigation
to strike in aid of persons with whom there is a unit, of economic
interest. Such unity was disclosed by the actual -circumstances
of the case. After a detailed analysis of the facts, the minority
of the Court thus summarized the economic justification for con-
duct which the majority held subject to an injunction: ". . . in
refusing to work on materials which threatened it, the union was
only refusing to aid in destroying itself." 1
Thus ended the litigation which gave the pitch to all future
readings of the Clayton Act. How much of the life of a statute
dealing with contentious social issues is determined by the gen-
eral outlook of judges upon society lies on the very sur-
face of the Duplex case. Thirteen federal judges were
called upon to apply the Clayton Act to the particular facts of
this case. Six found that the law called for a hands-off policy
in the conflict between the Printing Press Company and the
Machinists; seven found that the law called for interference
against the Machinists. The decision of the majority of the
Supreme Court is, of course, the authoritative ruling. But in-
formed professional opinion would find it difficult to attribute
greater intrinsic sanction for the views of the seven judges,
White, McKenna, Day, Van Devanter, Pitney, McReynolds and
Rogers than for the opposing interpretation of the six judges,
Holmes, Brandeis, Clarke, Hough, Learned Hand and Manton.
Statutory construction in doubtful cases is a choice among
competing policies as starting points for reasoning. This
is the real explanation of the conflict of opinion in the
provision of the Clayton Act by adding the words "and lawful" after the
word "peaceful." Duplex Co. v. Deering, supra note 51, at 474, 41 Sup. Ct.
at 179.
149 "But Congress did not restrict the provision to employers and work-
ingmen in their employ. By including 'employers and employees' and 'per-
sons employed and persons seeking employment' it showed that it was not
aiming merely at a legal relationship between a specific employer and his
employees. Furthermore, the plaintiff's contention proves too much. If
the words are to receive a strict technical construction, the statute will
have no application to disputes between employers of labor and worhingmen,
since the very acts to which it applies sever the continuity of the legal
relationship." Brandeis, J., ibid. 487-S8, 41 Sup. Ct. at 184. Cf. the con-
gressional debates on this very question, supra p. 902.
:150 Supra note 51, at 482, 41 Sup. Ct. at 182.
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Duplex case. But even without a critique of the policy
which the majority adopted, two general observations may be
made. A difference of judgment upon the facts of the con-
troversy between the Duplex Company and the Machinists might
readily have brought the situation within the Court's own re-
quirement that, to enjoy immunity, defendants must be "affected
in a proximate and substantial, not merely a sentimental or
sympathetic, sense by the cause of the dispute." 151 Secondly,
by using the "secondary boycott" as the concept governing the
decision, the Court imported the term of multiple meaning which
Congress had kept out of its legislation. The crux of the Duplex
case was interference by New York unionists with work in New
York on Duplex printing machines in the course of a controversy
against the Duplex Company in Battle Creek, Michigan. This
is the familiar case of refusal to work upon non-union made
goods within the same industry. Whether, as part of an indus-
trial conflict between the Duplex Company and the Machinists'
Union, unionists in New York should be allowed to exercise their
power of economic coercion by seeking to interfere with the
installation of Duplex presses is an issue about which men will
naturally differ. On this issue, judges might give different
answers, but they will be talking about the same thing. To
attempt, however, to decide the propriety of a "secondary boy-
cott" is to leave definiteness of fact for ambiguity of phrasing.
For to talk about "secondary boycott" is to become involved in
a confusion of terms and, therefore, in a confusion of thought.16"
At the time of the Duplex decision, there was pending before
151 Compare the facts as summarized by Mr. Justice Brandeis: "There
are in the United States only four manufacturers of such presses; and
they are in active competition. Between 1909 and 1913 the machinists'
union induced three of them to recognize and deal with the union, to grant
the eight-hour day; to establish a minimum wage scale and to comply with
other union requirements. The fourth, the Duplex Company, refused to
recognize the union; insisted upon conducting its factory on the open shop
principle; refused to introduce the eight-hour day and operated for the
most part, ten hours a day; refused to establish a minimum wage scale;
and disregarded other union standards. Thereupon two of the three
manufacturers who had assented to union conditions notified the union
that they should be obliged to terminate their agreements with it unless
their competitor, the Duplex Company, also entered into the agreement
-with the union, which, in giving more favorable terms to labor, imposed
correspondingly greater burdens upon the employer." Ibid. 479-80, 41 Sup.
Ct. at 181.
152 Professor T. R. Powell observes that since the Clayton Act granted
for the first time the right of injunction under the Sherman Law to private
parties, -Pitney, J. was in error in viewing § 20 as a restriction on old
equity powers, rather than as a limitation on a new addition to equity
powers. (1928) 13 ACADEMY OF POL. SCI. PROC. 54. Of course, this point
cannot be made where federal jurisdiction obtains for any reason other
than the Sherman Act.
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the Supreme Court America.n Steel Foundries v. Tr-City Ccntral
Trades Council.153 This case presented for review an injunction
that issued from a district court as a restraint upon "persuasion"
and "picketing," which was modified by the Circuit Court of
Appeals to permit "persuasion" and to restrain only "picketing
in a threatening or unlawful manner." 14 The Supreme Court,
it will be recalled, 5r affirmed the first modification but reversed
the second. The Court was of opinion that "the name 'picket'
indicated a militant purpose inconsistent with peaceable persua-
sion," and that "the presence of groups of pickets" 15G resulted
"in inevitable intimidation." While professing "evel regard to
the congressional intention manifested in the act," the Court,
following the Duplex case, held that Section 20 "introduces no
new principle into the equity jurisprudence of those [federal]
courts," and "is merely declaratory of what was the best practice
always." It, therefore, concluded that picketing as the case
revealed it, "is unlawful and cannot be peaceable and may be
properly enjoined by the specific term because its meaning is
clearly understood in the sphere of the controversy by those who
are palties to -it."
The Court ruled that Section 20 was intended merely as
"declaratory of what was the best practice always." In con-
demning "picketing," the Court relies on "many well reasoned
authorities," while conceding "there has been contrariety of
view." But it does not articulate the criteria by which it deter:
mined what, in the intention of Congress, "was the best prac-
tice." Again, the opinion repeats the technique in the Duplex
decision, in that it characterizes conduct with a word that to the
Court carries evil connotation, inhibits the conduct because of
the label and supports the result by the observation that "Con-
gress carefully refrained from using" "the sinister name of
'picketing'" in Section 20.
While protecting "the right of the employer incident to his
business and property to free access" of his employees, the Court
also recognized the right of strikers to persuade those working
for an employer "to join the ranks of his opponents in a lawful
economic struggle." How are such conflicting rights to be rec-
onciled? The Court gave this answer:
"Each case must turn on its own circumstances. It is a case
for the flexible remedial power of a court of equity which may
try one mode of restraint, and if it fails or proves to be too
25S257 U. S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72 (1921).
154 Tri-City Cent. T. Council v. American Steel Foundries, zmpra note 12S.
155 Supra note 153.
156 , 'Singly or in concert,' says the Clayton Act. 'Not together, but
singly,' says the Chief Justice in interpreting it." T. R. Powell, op. cit.
supra note 152.
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drastic, may change it. We think that the strikers and their
sympathizers engaged in the economic struggle should be limited
to one representative for each point of ingress and egress in
the plant or place of business and that all others be enjoined
from congregating or loitering at the plant or in the neighboring
streets by which access is had to the plant, that such represen-
tatives should have the right of observation, communication and
persuasion but with special admonition that their communica-
tion, arguments and appeals shall not be abusive, libelous or
threatening, and that they shall not approach individuals to-
gether but singly, and shall not in their single efforts at com-
munication or persuasion obstruct an unwilling listener by
importunate following or dogging his steps. This is not laid
down as a rigid rule, but only as one which should apply to this
case under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence and
which may be varied in other cases." 1'7
Thus, the Court derived from the Clayton Act privileges of
persuasion not only for the actual strikers, who were former
employees of the complainant, but also for members of the
defendant unions who were neither former nor prospective em-
ployees of the complainant. The concession was drawn from
broad considerations:
"Labor unions are recognized by the Clayton Act as legal when
instituted for mutual help and lawfully carrying out their legiti-
mate objects. They have long been thus recognized by the
courts. They were organized out of the necessities of the situa-
tion. A single employee was helpless in dealing with an
employer. He was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for
the maintenance of himself and family. If the employer refused
to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless
unable to leave the employ and to resist arbitrary and unfair
treatment. Union was essential to give laborers opportunity to
deal on equality with their employer. They united to exert
influence upon him and to leave him in a body in order by this
inconvenience to induce him to make better terms with them.
They were withholding their labor of economic value to make
him pay what they thought it was worth. The right to combine
for such a lawful purpose has in many years not been denied by
any court. The strike became a lawful instrument in a lawful
economic struggle or competition between employer and employ-
ees as to the share or division between them of the joint product
of labor and capital. To render this combination at all effective,
employees must make their combination extend beyond one shop.
It is helpful to have as many as may be in the same trade in
the same community united, because in the competition between
employers they are bound to be affected by the standard of
wages of their trade in the neighborhood." 1,1
15, American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Trades Council, supra note 153,
at 206, 42 Sup. Ct. at 77.
15B Ibid. 209, 42 Sup. Ct. at 78.
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This enlightened analysis by Chief Justice Taft of the social
justification of trade unions writes its own commentary upon
the ruling in the Dzplex case. Is the interest of members of a
national union who threaten a strike in New York in aid of a
strike by fellow-members in Michigan against an employer there,
whose continued resistance to the union was "threatening the
standing of a whole organization and the standards of all its
members" merely interest in a "sentimental or sympathetic,
sense?" The justification of a substantial common concern so
clearly expounded by the Chief Justice was present in the Duplex
as well as in the Ti-City case, unless the Court rested the differ-
ences in result between the two cases upon the fact that in the
Tri-City case the stage of the controversy was confined to a
smaller geographic area.
Following the Tri-City case, we find seventeen decisions 15 in
the lower federal courts, counting only reported cases, that
sanction the issuance of an injunction notwithstanding Section
20 of the Clayton Act. The opinions add little to the doctrines
we have canvassed. According to them, such immunities as the
Clayton Act formulated do not apply to union organizers who
operate in non-union territories, for they are neither employees
nor ex-employees, but rank "outsiders." 1-C1 The immunities do
not operate when "persuasion" would hinder some industry en-
gaged in interstate commerce or is incidental to an "unlawful
-9 Buyer v. Guillan, 271 Fed. 65 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921); Quinlivan v.
Dail-Overland Co., 274 Fed. 56 (C. C. A. 6th, 1921); Charleston Dry Dock.
& Machine Co. v. O'Rourke, 274 Fed. 811 (D. S. C. 1921); Gasaway v.
Borderland Coal Corporation, 278 Fed. 56 (C. C. A. 7th, 1921); Lyons
v. United States Shipping Board E. F. Corp., 278 Fed. 144 (C. C. A. 5th,
1922); Central Metal Products Corporation v. O'Brien, 273 Fed. 827 (N.
D., Ohio, 1922); United States v. Vannatta, 278 Fed. 559 (E. D. N. Y.
1922); Portland Terminal Co. v. Foss, 283 Fed. 204 (D. Ale. 1922),
rev'd, 287 Fed. 33 (C. C. A. 1st, 1923) ; United States v. Railway Employecs"
Dept. A. F. L., 283 Fed. 479, 286 Fed. 228 (N. D. Ill. 1922) ; Great Northern
Ry. v. Local G. F. L. of I. A. of M., 283 Fed. 557 (D. Mont. 1922);
Great Northern Ry. v. Brosseau, 286 Fed. 414 (D. N. D. 1923); New
York etc. R. R. v. Ry. Employees' Dept., 288 Fed. 588 (D. Conn. 1923);
United States v. Taliaferro, 290 Fed. 214 (W. D. Va. 1922), aff'd, 290
Fed. 906 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923); Montgomery v. Pacific Electric Ry., 293
Fed. 680 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923); Western Union Tel. Co. v. International
B. of E. Workers, 2 F. (2d) 993 (N. D. Ill. 1924); Waitresses' Union,
Local No. 249 v. Benish Restaurant Co. Inc., 6 F. (2d) 568 (C. C. A. 8th,
1925); International Organization v. Red Jacket C. C. & C. Co., 18 F.
(2d) 839 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927), ccrt. denied, 275 U. S. 536, 48 Sup. Ct.
31 (1928).
160 Montgomery v. Pacific Electric Ry.; Waitresses' Union, Local No.
249 v. Benish Restaurant Co., Inc.; International Organization v. Red
Jacket C. C. & C. Co., all supra note 159; Ferguson v. Peake, 18 F. (2d)
166 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1927); see Note (1927) 40 HLAnv. L. Rv. 896.
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conspiracy." 161 They do not operate when the strike is prac-
tically over and the plant is operating on a normal basis.12 Nor
do they sanction persuasion to break a contract of employment
or a contract not to join a union.163 One district court actually
held that the immunities of Section 20 do not extend to striking
employees because the very act of striking terminates the rela-
tionship of employer and employee.164 When available, the scope
of the exemptions has been held not broad enough to sanction
the use of the word "scab," to permit utterance of bad lan-
guage.16 5 Unreported decrees, so far as available, are more than
cumulative; they emphasize the tendencies here traced.
If after this judicial experience anything survived of the
roseate hopes aroused by the Clayton Act, it evaporated on April
11, 1927. On that day in the Bedford Cut Stone case,1' 6 the
Supreme Court ordered an injunction against the Journeymen
Stone Cutters Association to restrain simple refusal to work
upon stone which had been partly cut at the quarries by men
working in opposition to the Association. The application which
the courts made of the Sherman Law and the Clayton Act in
labor controversies is, indeed, a study in irony, upon which the
dissenting opinion in the Bedford case made these reflections:
"If, on the undisputed facts of this case, refusal to work can
be enjoined, Congress created by the Sherman Law and the
Clayton Act an instrument for imposing restraint upon labor
which reminds of involuntary servitude. The Sherman Law was
held in United States v. United States Steel Corporation, 251 U.
S. 417, to permit capitalists to combine in a single corporation
261 United States v. Railway Employees' Dept. A. F. L.; United States
v. Railway Employees' Dept. A. F. L.; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Inter-
national B. of E. Workers, all supra note 159.
162 Quinlivan v. Dail-Overland Co., supra note 159. It is of interest here
to note the Wisconsin statute which defined "when a strike is in progress":
"A strike or lockout shall be deemed to exist as long as the usual con-
comitants of a strike or lockout exist; or unemployment on the part of
the workers affected continues; or any payments of strike benefits is being
made; or any picketing is maintained; or publication is being made of the
existence of such strike or lockout." Wis. STAT. (1927) § 103.43 (la).
163 Charleston Dry Dock & Machine Co. v. O'Rourke; International Or-
ganization v. Red Jacket C. C. & C. Co., both supra note 159.
1 164 Canoe Creek Coal Co. v. Christinson, 281 Fed. 559 (D. Ky. 1922).
This case was reversed on another ground, sub. nom. Sandefur v. Canoe
Creek Coal Co., 293 Fed. 379 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923), 266 U. S. 42, 45 Sup.
Ct. 18 (1924).
165 United States v. Taliaferro, supra note 159.
166 Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U. S.
37, 47 Sup. Ct. 522 (1927). The majority opinion written by Mr. Justice
Sutherland was concurred in by Taft, C. J., Van Devanter, McReynolds,
Butler, JJ. Special concurring opinions were written by Sandford and
Stone, JJ. Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote a dissenting opinion in which
Holmes, J., concurred.
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50 per cent. of the steel industry of the United States dominating
the trade through its vast resources. The Sherman Law was
held in United States v. United Shoc Machinery Co., 247 U. S.
32, to permit capitalists to combine in another corporation prac-
tically the whole shoe machinery industryj of the country, neces-
sarily giving it a position of dominance over shoe-manufacturing
in America. It would, indeed, be strange if Congress had by
the same Act willed to deny to members of a small craft of
workingmen the right to cooperate in simply refraining from
work, when that course was the only means of self-protection
against a combination of militant and powerful employers. I
cannot believe that Congress did so." ",-
And the process by which this ironic effect was achieved, Mr.
Justice Stone elucidated in his separate opinion:
"As an original proposition, I should have doubted whether the
Sherman Act prohibited a labor union from peaceably refusing
to work upon material produced by non-union labor or by a
rival union, even though interstate commerce were affected. In
the light of the policy adopted by Congress in the Clayton Act,
with respect to organized labor, and in the light of Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1; United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 178-180, I should not have thought
that such action as is now complained of was to be regarded
as an unreasonable and therefore prohibited restraint of trade.
But in Duplex Printing Press Co., v. Decering, 254 U. S. 443,
these views were rejected by a majority of the court and a
decree was authorized restraining in precise terms any agree-
ment not to work or refusal to work, such as is involved here.
Whatever additional facts there may have been in that case,
the decree enjoined the defendants from using 'even persuasion
with the object or having the effect of causing any person or
persons to decline employment, cease employment, or not seek
employment, or to refrain from work or cease working under any
person, firm, or corporation being a purchaser or prospective
purchaser of any printing press or presses from complainant,
.' (p. 478). These views, which I should not have hesi-
tated to apply here, have now been rejected again largely on the
authority of the Duplex case. For that reason alone, I concur
with the majority." 168
The Clayton Act was the product of twenty years of volumi-
nous agitation. It came as clay into the hands of the federal
courts, and we have attempted a portrayal of what they made of
it. The result justifies an application of a familiar bit of French
cynicism: the more things are legislatively changed, the more
they remain the same judicially. 1 9
167 Brandeis, J., dissenting, ibid. 65, 47 Sup. Ct. at 531. See Frey, The
Double Standard in Applying the Sherman Act (1928) 18 Am. LAB. LEG.
Rzv. 302.
168 Supra note 166, at 55, 47 Sup. Ct. at 528.
169 Since this conviction has gathered, efforts in Congress have been
renewed. Beginning with the Sixty-sLxth Congress, the following bills to
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But the Supreme Court of the United States does not control
only the law of injunctions in the federal courts. The Fourteenth
Amendment-the protection of due process and the guaranty
of the equal protection of the laws-does not give to the Supreme
Court the last word merely over new policies of substantive law
affecting industrial relations. Through the Amendment, the
Supreme Court also scrutinizes legislation regulating the scope
of equitable relief afforded by states in local labor disputes. We
have already examined the decisions by the respective state
courts upon legislation dealing with this subject in California,
Massachusetts and Arizona.170 The California statute, we saw,
was so interpreted as to create no substantial contraction of
equitable jurisdiction; the Massachusetts statute was invali-
dated; the Arizona law was construed to permit peaceful picket-
ing and, so construed, was sustained. Only the Arizona decision
reached the Supreme Court, and on the ground that it contra-
vened the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. While, in
language, the Arizona statute was practically identical with Sec-
tion 20 of the Clayton Act,171 the meaning which the Arizona
Court had placed upon it led to its invalidation by the Supreme
Court.172
The policy of Arizona, formulated by its legislature and sus-
tained by its court, refused relief 73 for the following conduct
by strikers: verbal castigation of employers, their business, their
affect equity jurisdiction in labor disputes have been proposed: H. R. 7783,
H. R. 7784, 66th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. 12622, 67th Cong., 2d Sess.;
H. R. 3208, H. R. 8663, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 972, H. R. 3920, 69th
Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 1482, H. R. 10082, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. During the
Seventieth Congress, 1st Session, extensive hearings were held by the
Senate Judiciary Committee. See HEARINGS ON S. 1482, LibuTINa Scorn
OF INJUNCTIONS IN LABOR DisPuTEs (1928). See (1928) 10 LAW AND
LABORl 3 for comment against the latest bills; ibid. 169, an article entitled
Labor and the Political Conventions, which contrasts the platforms of the
Republicans and Democrats in the 1928 national election.
170 Supra 893 et seq.
2
7 1 The Arizona statute is identical with the Clayton Bill as first reported
to Congress and prior to its amendment on the floor and in conference
committee.
172 Truax v. Corrigan, supra note 12. This decision is criticized adversely
in Comment (1922) 10 CALIF. L. REV. 237; Note (1922) 22 COL. L. Rav.
252; Comment (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 408.
173 Of course, no conduct was legalized by this statute; it merely with.
drew the right of injunction against certain specified acts. Thus, Pitney,
J. in his dissenting opinion was compelled to observe: "Paragraph 1464
does not modify any substantive rule of law, but only restricts the processes
of the courts of 'equity. Ordinary legal remedies remain; and I cannot
believe that the use of the injunction in such cases-however important-
is so essential to the right of acquiring, possessing and enjoying property
that its restriction or elimination amounts to a deprivation of liberty or
property without due process of law, within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Truax v. Corrigan, supra note 12, at 349, 42 Sup. Ct. at 136,
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employees and their customers; use of epithets; patrolling in
front of plaintiffs' business continuously during business hours
with banners announcing plaintiffs' unfairness by insulting and
loud appeals.174 All this, the Supreme Court ruled, was "moral
coercion by illegal annoyance and obstruction . . . plainly a
conspiracy "17 and as such a deprivation of plaintiffs' property
without due process of law. But, in reply to the contention that
the Arizona statute did not withhold from the plaintiffs all
remedies but only the relief of injunction, the Court found a
denial of the equal protection of the laws.27 1 It was held dis-
criminatory to withdraw the right to resort to equity in this
class of cases and to continue that right in other cases. The
statute drew a distinction between former employees and other
tortfeasors and this, the Court held, an unreasonable classifi-
cation. In the language of the Chief Justice:
"The necessary effect of these provisions and of Paragraph
1464 is that the plaintiffs in error would have had the right to
an injunction against such a campaign as that conducted by the
defendants in error, if it had been directed against the plaintiffs'
business and property in any hind of a controversy which was not
a dispute between employer and former employees." 177
But the plaintiffs had open to them the same protection that was
available to all other persons similarly circumstanced. There
was equality as between these plaintiffs and all potential plain-
tiffs. There was inequality only between these plaintiffs in a
suit against their former employees and the same plaintiffs
174 As this case was submitted on complaint and demurrer, Chief Justice
Taft felt free to "analyze the facts as averred.and draw its [the Court's]
own inferences as to their ultimate effect.... ." Ibid. 325, 42 Sup. Ct. at 127.
175- Ibid. 328, 42 Sup. Ct. at 128. For early views of Chief Justice Taft
upon this general subject, see his opinion as judge of the Superior Court
of Cincinnati in Moores v. Bricklayers Union, 23 WrEKLY L. BULL. 48
(1890).
176 Supra note 12, at 330 et seq., 42 Sup. Ct. at 129 ct scq. As to the
relationship between the "due process" clause and the "equal protection"
clause, see Taft, C. J., ibid. 331-33, 42 Sup. Ct. at 129. He says, in part:
"It may be that they overlap, that a violation of one may involve at times
the violation of the other, but the spheres of the protection they offer are
not coterminous.... It [the equal protection clause] sought an equality of
treatment of all persons, even though all enjoyed the protection of due
process." Of course, as the equal protection clause appears only in the
Fourteenth Amendment and not in the Fifth, it does not apply to congrcz-
sional legislation.
17 Ibid. 331, 42 Sup. Ct. at 129. The views which through the decision
in Truax v. Corrigan became authoritative interpretations of the Constitu-
tion were foreshadowed by the Chief Justice, before he came to the Supreme
Court, in his inaugural address on March 4, 1909. 16 MEsGcs AZr D PA,'rEns
OF THE PnESmENTS (1917) 7368, 7378, and later in an address before the
Cincinnati Law School on May 23, 1914, (1916) 5 KY. L. J. 3, 22-23.
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against persons not formerly in their employ. The employers
were found to be without equal protection because they had
fewer remedies against one class of tortfeasors than against
other classes. In other words, an employer was unequally pro-
tected as against himself. This was reasoning which four Jus-
tices could not accept.
The notable dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Pitney rescued
the equal protection clause from an exercise in logomachy. He
allowed full scope for the practical differentiation demanded of
law-making in industrialized society, and did not ask legislatures
to move in a realm of abstract geometry:
"Cases arising under this clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, preeminently, call for the application of the settled rule
that before one may be heard to oppose sthte legislation upon
the ground of its repugnance to the Federal Constitution he
must bring himself within the class affected by the alleged un-
constitutional feature.
"A disregard of the rule in the present case has resulted, as
it seems to me, in treating as a discrimination what, so far as
plaintiffs are concerned, is no more than failure to include in
the statute a case which in consistency ought, it is said, to have
been covered-an omission immaterial to plaintiffs. This is to
transform the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment from a
guaranty of the 'protection of equal laws' into an insistence upon
laws complete, perfect, symmetrical.
"The guaranty of 'equal protection' entitled plaintiffs to treat-
ment not less favorable than that given to others similarly cir-
cumstanced. This the present statute gives them. The provision
does not entitle them, as against their present opponents under
present circumstances, to protection as adequate as they might
have against opponents of another class under like circumstances.
I find no authority fof the proposition that the guaranty was
intended to secure equality of protection 'not only for all but
against all similarly situated,' except as between persons who
properly belong in the same class." 178
The dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis dealt more particularly
with the due process argument. He marshalled a massive array
of judicial and legislative experience to substantiate the reasons
given by the Arizona court in support of the Arizona legis-
lation. Indeed, he demonstrated that Arizona in withholding the
injunction from the conduct in question was doing no more than
expressing by legislation the policy enforced by many state
courts without the sanction of legislation,1 which led him to
these observations:
i. . . the Supreme Court of Arizona made a choice between
well-established precedents laid down on either side by some of
178 Truax v. Corrigan, supra note 12, at 350-51, 42 Sup. Ct. at 136.
179 Ibid. 354 et seq., 42 Sup. Ct. 137 et seq.
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the strongest courts in the country. Can this court say that
thereby it deprived the plaintiff of his property without due
process of law?" 180
To the majority, however, "the illegality of the means used
is without doubt and fundamental" and a "law which operates
to make lawful such a wrong" is beyond "the legislative power
of a State." 181 The inference cannot be resisted that if a state
deems interference in industrial controversies through injunc-
tions against picketing and its concomitants unwise, such a policy
must be worked out through judicial process. The same rules
formulated by a legislature are, apparently, "purely arbitrary
or capricious exercise" of the legislative power.
Thus the Supreme Court not only wrote decisively between
the lines of federal legislation, but through its decision in Truax.
v. Corrigan it made these interlineations a necessary condition to
survival of all similar state measures. 82 The states followed the
example set by Congress-Kansas in 1913,'MAinnesota and Utah
in 1917, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington and Wisconsin in
1919, Illinois in 1925, New Jersey in 1926 18--in measures for
the greater part identical with Section 20 of the Clayton Act.
Even within their narrow margin of freedom in construing these
statutes, state courts largely took their cue from the Supreme
Court. Such statutes do not make new law, but are merely
declaratory of the old; the legislation did not transmute what
was theretofore unlawful into legal innocence; injunctive relief
persists against the "secondary boycott," and group picketing,
even against peaceful patrolling. Still in harmony with federal
precedent, state interpretation of state statutes applies the immu-
18O Ibid. 371, 42 Sup. Ct. at 144.
181 Ibid. 328-330, 42 Sup. Ct. at 128.
182 The general counsel of the Wisconsin State Federation of Labor,
testifying before the recent Senate hearings, thus spoke of the Tri-City
case: ". . . it went further than any of the decisions, and being a decision
of the United States Supreme Court, had a very, very bad effect upon the
courts so far as the administration of these cases was concerned, for the
Tri-City case was followed by the State Courts. I can give my ex,,perience
in Wisconsin .... as a result of the Tri-City case, [the judges] rather
infer that they should follow the precedent established by Judge Taft and
the courts have universally, in Wisconsin, . . .limited picketing to the use
of one picket, no matter how large the plant, one picket to each entrance
of the plant. . . . No matter how much we argue, or how much we en-
deavor to get them to interpret the decision in some other manner, we can
not get the courts to change." SENATE HEMAINGS ON S. 1482, p. 559.
183 KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) § 60-1107; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927)
§ 4256-57; UTAH COMP. LAWS (1917) § 3652-53; N. D. Corn. LAws An.
(Supp. 1925) § 7214a2; ORm. LAws (Olson, 1920) § 6S15-17; WAsiH. COiP.
STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 7612; Wis. STAT. (1927) § 133.07; ILL. REV.
STAT. (Cahill, 1927) c. 22, § 58; N. J. Laws 1926, c. 207. See Chamberlain,
The Legislature and Labor Injuinstins (1925) 11 A. B. A. J. 815.
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nities, such as they are, only to former employees; they do not
govern where there is no strike of the plaintiff's own employees,
or in a dispute for an "unlawful purpose," or in a dispute detri-
mental to the state.184
The powerful influence exerted, naturally enough, by the
Supreme Court upon state adjudications is evidenced by recent
decisions in Illinois 185 and New Jersey. 8" The statutes of both
states are, in substance, identical and neither was held to sanc-
tion peaceful picketing. The opinion of Chief Justice Taft in
the Ti-City case was the guiding light for both decisions. But
the New Jersey case found even the federal law not sufficiently
stringent:
"A single sentinel constantly parading in front of a place of
employment for an extended length of time may be just as effec-
tive in striking terror to the souls of the employees bound there
by their duty as was the swinging pendulum in Poe's famous
story 'The Pit and the Pendulum' to victims chained in its ulti-
mate band. In fact, silence is sometimes more striking and
impressive than the loud mouthings of the mob. . . . It is
admitted that back of the demonstrations is the full force and
power of the American Federation of Labor." 187
The legislation we have summarized had, as its essential im-
pulse, the conviction that labor unions "were organized," in the
184 Greenfield v. Central Labor Council, 104 Ore. 236, 192 Pac. 783 (1920) ;
Heitkemper v. Central Labor Council, 99 Ore. 1, 192 Pac. 765 (1920); Bull
v. International Alliance, 119 Kan. 713, 241 Pac. 459 (1925); Pacific TyptI-
setting Co. v. I. T. U., 125 Wash. 273, 216 Pac. 358 (1923); A. J. Monday
Co. v. Automobile A. & V. Workers, 171 Wis. 532, 177 N. W. 867 (1920);
Pac. Coast Coal Co. v. Dist. No. 10 U. M. W. A., 122 Wash. 423, 210 Poe.
953 (1922); Crane & Co. v. Snowden, 112 Kan. 217, 210 Pac. 475 (1922);
and see Schuberg v. Local Int'l. Alliance of Stage Employees (1926)
(Sup. Ct. British Columbia) 8 LAW AND LABOR 239.
The Wisconsin case supra held that the statute was inapplicable to a
strike "purely and simply for the closed shop." Let the general counsel
of the Wisconsin State Federation of Labor tell the story that followed
this! discussion: "Well, we went back to the legislature, the labor union
did, that is. . .- we simply amended that bill in Wisconsin by cutting out
some of the provisions which the court held limited the application and
we put in the words 'any dispute affecting labor'. . . and that is the way
the matter now stands .... No court interpretation has been had as yet
an the act as amended." SENATE HEARINGS ON S. 1482, p. 560.
185 Ossey v. Retail Clerks' Union, 326 Ill. App. 405 (1927). Lower courts
in Illinois had passed upon the constitutionality of the statute: see Inter-
national Tailoring Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America,
(1925) 7 LAW AND LABOR 237; Ossey v. Retail Clerks' Union, (1926) 8
LAW AND LABOR 5. And see Comment (1928) 22 ILL. L. REV. 888; (1925)
15 AM. LAB. LEG. REV. 233.
186 Gevas v. Greek Restaurant Workers' Club, 99 N. J. Eq. 770, 782-83,
134 At]. 309, 315 (1926).
187 Ibid.
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language of the Chief Justice, "out of the necessities of the
situation." That the concrete remedies by which this justifica-
tion was to be realized encountered feelings of unfriendliness on
the part of courts is a conclusion not easy to escape. The de-
cisions would not have been otherwise if courts had applied as
a conscious guide the belief that there may be unions, but they
must not be strong.
LEGISLATION AFFECTING EQUITY PROCEDURE
There remain for consideration legislative prescriptions for
procedure applicable to labor injunctions, and what courts have
done with them. Procedure, it will be remembered, becomes
significant at two stages in these litigations: in the process
leading up to the issuance of an ex parte restraining order or
temporary injunction, and in subsequent attempts to punish
disobedience.
In our earlier description of the prevailing practice of grant-
ing restraining orders without notice to the opposing sides and
of basing temporary injunctions upon affidavits, incidental men-
tion was made of the legislative corrections that were proposed
in New York and Massachusetts, and at Washington.188 Bills
formulating procedural guides and establishing limits to the dis-
cretion of federal judges in issuing ex parte restraining orders *
S Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit. supra note 4, at 376.
189 The federal legislative history of cx parte orders may be noted.
The 1793 revision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that no injunction
shall "issue in any case without reasonable previous notice to the adverse
party. . . ." 1 STAT. 333, 335; see New York v. Connecticut, 4 Dall. 1
(U. S. 1799). So far as the reports disclose the facts, despite this statute
restraining orders were granted without prior notice to defendants. In
1873, § 263 of the Judicial Code was enacted, authorizing the issuance of
restraining orders without notice in the discretion of the court. That
provision continued effective until the passage of the Clayton Act.
In his address accepting the nomination for President on July 28, 1903,
Mr. Taft thus expressed his sympathy with the early federal practice in
the case of a lawful strike: "In the case of a lawful strike, the sending
of a formidable document restraining a number of defendants from doing
a great many different things which the plaintiff avers they are threatening
to do, often so discourages men always reluctant to go into a strike from
continuing what is their lawful right. This has made the laboring man
feel that an injustice is done in the issuing of a writ without notice. I
conceive that in the treatment of this question it is the duty of the citizen
and the legislator to view the subject from the standpoint of the man who
believes himself to be unjustly treated, as well as from that of the com-
munity at large. I have suggested the remedy of returning in such cases
to the original practice under the old statute of the United States and the
rules in equity adopted by the Supreme Court, which did not permit the
issuing of an injunction without notice. In this respect, the Republican
Convention has adopted another remedy, that, without going so far,
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were before Congress as early as 1901.19) Thereafter such pro-
posals were introduced in Congress session after session." They
did not encounter vigorous opposition. Neither, however, did
they arouse the dynamic interest of labor and its friends. In
the earlier phases of the movement for legislative relief, labor
evinced little understanding of how much turns on rules of
procedure.
We have already quoted from the message of President Taft
to Congress on December 7, 1909, in which he recommended cer-
tain restrictions upon ex parte orders, the establishment of a
time limit for them and specifications as to the form of order." '
In that session, both the House and Senate considered such
measures.193  In the second session of the next Congress, the
Sixty-second, provisions embodying such proposals passed the
House as part of the Clayton Bill,94 and the next Congress en-
acted them, with scarcely any opposition, as Sections 17, 18, and
19 of the Clayton Act.1 95
Section 17 19 permits the granting of a temporary restraining
promises to be efficacious in securing proper consideration in such cases
by courts, by formulating into a legislative act the best present practice."
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTEENTH REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION
(1908) 219.
190 S. 4233, H. R. 8917, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. For earlier bills, see S.
1563, S. 1898, 53d Cong., 2d Sess.
191 H, R. 18327, 58th Cong., 3d Sess.; S. 2829, H. R. 9328, H. R. 17976,
H. R. 18171, H. R. 18446, H. R. 18752, 59th Cong., 1st Sss.; S. 5888, H. R,
21991, 60th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. 26609, 60th Cong., 2d Sess.
192 Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit. supra note 4, at 367. The words of
President Taft were used in support of the Clayton committee's first report
of H. R. 23635, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., H. Rep. No. 612.
193 S. 4481, H. R. 16026, 61st Cong., 2d Sess.
294 Section 263 of H. R. 23635, 48 CONG. REC. 6463 (1912); passed the
House, ibid. 6470.
195 See 48 CONG. REC. 6415 (1912) and 45 CONG. REC. 343 (1910).
19G38 STAT. 737 (1914), 28 U. S. C. § 381 (1926). In 1912, the Supreme
Court promulgated new Equity Rules, and Rule 73 thereof is practically
a complete forerunner of this section. It was adopted at the suggestion of
the Bar Committee of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 9th circuit. It
was subsequently held to embody principles long established in the federal
courts. Cathey v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 228 Fed. 26 (C. C. A. 4th, 1915).
Rule 73 (226 U. S. 670) provides: "No preliminary injunction shall be
granted without notice to the opposite party. Nor shall any temporary
restraining order be granted without notice to the opposite party, unless
it shall clearly appear from specifid facts, shown by affidavit or by tho
verified bill, that immediate and irreparable loss or damage will result to
the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice. In case a temporary
restraining order shall be granted without notice, in the contingency speci-
fied, the matter shall be made returnable at the earliest possible time,
and in no event later than ten days from the date of the order, and shall
take precedence of all matters, except older matters of the same character.
When the matter comes up for hearing the party who obtained the tom-
pfrary restraining order -shall lroceed with his application for a pre-
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order without notice to defendants only when it is made clearly
to appear under oath that the applicant will otherwise suffer
irreparable injury. The order must state the hour of, and rea-
sons for, its issue; it expires within a fixed time after entry,19?
not to exceed ten days, though it may be extended for "good
cause shown." Provision is further made for expeditious hear-
ing of the motion for a temporary injunction, and the defendants
are given the right to dissolve or modify the restraining order
on two days' notice. Section 18 requires the giving of security
as a condition toi the granting of a restraining order or ten-
porary injunction-a matter theretofore within the discretion
of judges. Section 19 demands that a restraining order shall
be specific and that it describe the acts restrained explicitly, not
by reference to the bill of complaint or other document.oS The
same section limits the scope of the binding effect of the injunc-
tion by making it apply only to "the parties to the suit, their
officers, agents, servants, employees and attorneys, or those in
active concert or participating with them," who must be shown to
"have received actual notice of the same." 101
In the course of the debate upon these clauses, a member of
the House denied the existence of any judicial abuse calling for
correction. John W. Davis replied that reported cases
liminary injunction, and if he does not do so the court shall dissolve his
temporary restraining order. Upon two days notice to the party obtaining
such temporary restraining order, the opposite party may appear and
move the dissolution or modification of the order, and in that event the
court or judge shall proceed to hear and determine the motion as expedi-
tiously as the ends of justice may require. Every temporary restraining
order shall be forthwith filed in the clerk's office."
197 Considerable opposition revolved about this provision, the minority
desiring to have the order date from the time of service rather than the
time of its entry. We quote from H. Rep. 612, pt. 2, 62d Cong., 2d
Sess., p. 4: "We can conceive of no more certain method of depriving a
suitor of essential equitable protection."
298Further quoting from the above minority report: "This proposal
multiplies the delays, difficulties, and inconveniences of procedure indefi-
nitely. It requires every order to be a history, to repeat in irrelevant
and cumbersome detail all the preliminary pleadings, and instead of en-
lightening the parties against whom it was issued ... the procedure pre-
scribed would increase his confusion and doubt." Ibid. 5-6.
"9 The majority report of the committee said as to this: "... a safe-
guard against what have been heretofore known as dragnet or blanket
injunctions, by which large numbers may be accused, and eventually pun-
ished, for violating injunctions in cases in which they were not made parties
in the legal sense and of which they had only constructive notice, equivalent
in most cases to none at all." H. Rep. 612, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4. To
which the minority replied: "The majority offer in proof of the necessity
of their proposal merely an implication unwarrantedly reflecting upon the
judiciary and without supporting proof of any character." H. Rep. 612,
pt. 2, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 5.
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. .. show at least five glaring abuses which have crept
into the administration of this remedy. I name them:
The issuance of injunctions without notice.
The issuance of injunctions without bond.
The issuance of injunctions without detail.
The issuance of injunctions without parties.
And in trade disputes particularly the issuance of injunc-
tions against certain well-established and indisputable rights." '",,
Sections 17, 18, and 19 of the Clayton Act were intended to
correct the first four abuses enumerated by Mr. Davis. They
have now been "the law of the land" for fourteen years. What
have they accomplished? More restraining orders without notice
have been granted by federal courts within that period of time
than in any prior periodl of like duration. 20 1 Since 1914) we find
among reported cases alone more than fifteen such instances.0 12
And in most of them the orders remained effective without hear-
ing of any kind for a longer period than the normal ten days
allotted by Section 17.203 The other statutory safeguards have
likewise been ineffective. Disregard of the statutory require-
ment of setting forth the reasons for the order is merely im-
proper, but does not invalidate the order or the preliminary
injunction; 204 an injunction against "interfering in any respect"
with the complainant's business is as definite a way of express-
20048 CONG. REc. 6436 (1912).
201 Generally as to restraining orders without notice, see DOM3E, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (1928) § 173; Lane, Working under Fcdcral
Equity Rules (1915) 29 HARv. L. REV. 55.
202 Restraining orders have been granted without notice in the following
labor cases, among others, since 1912 (the timq of the promulgation of
Federal Equity Rule 73): Aluminum Castings Co. v. Local No. 84, 197
Fed. 221 (W. D. N. Y. 1912); Puget Sound Traction Co. v. Lowrey, 202
Fed. 263 (W. D. Wash. 1913); Sona v. Aluminum Castings Co., 214 Fed.
936 (C. C. A. 6th, 1914); Oates v. United States, 223 Fed. 1013 (C. C. A.
4th, 1915); Alaska S. S. Co. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n; Tri-
City Cent. T. Council v. American Steel Foundries; Stephens v. Ohio State
Telephone Co.; Dail-Overland Co. v. Willys-Overland, all supra note 128;
Local No. 7 of Bricklayer's Union v. Bowen, 278 Fed. 271 (S. D. Tex.
1922); Forrest v. United States, 277 Fed. 873 (C. C. A. 9th, 1922); United
States v. Ry. Employees' Dept.; Portland Terminal Co. v. Foss; New York,
N. H. & H. R. R. v. Ry. Employees' Dept., all supra note 159; Herkert &
Meisel Trunk Co. v. United Leatherworkers' I. U., 268 Fed. 662 (E. D. Mo.
1920); Great Northern Ry. v. Brosseau, 286 Fed. 414 (D. N. D. 1923);
Staudte & Rueckoldt Mfg. Co. v. Carpenter ' D. C., 12 F. (2d) 867 (C. C. A.
8th, 1926); Columbus Heating & Ventilating Co. v. Pittsburgh Building
Trades Council, 17 F. (2d) 806 (W. D. Pa. 1927).
203 A detailed tabular record of the use of the injunction in the federal
courts will be included in the writers' forthcoming book.
204 Lawrence v. St. L. S. F. Ry., 274 U. S. 588, 47 Sup. Ct. 720 (1927).
Compare insistence on strict compliance with procedural requirements im-
posed upon administrative agencies, such as public service commissions, in
Wichita R. R. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 260 U. S. 48, 43 Sup. Ct. 51 (1922).
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ing the conduct restrained "as it is possible to make it"; 21, a
stranger to an injunction suit may still be punished for contempt
of the injunction.200 And the unreported decrees issued by the
federal courts within the last three years, so far as available
for examination, pay little heed to the purpose of the Clayton
Act that the "defendants should never be left to guess at what
they are forbidden to do." 2.o7
Several states have enacted some or all of the procedural fea-
tures found in the. Clayton Act. Kansas, Minnesota, North
Dakota, Oregon, Utah and Wisconsin require that the complain-
ant must describe the plaintiff's property with particularity and
must carry the oath of the applicant or his agent.2'8 The Kansas
statute leaves to the court's discretion whether a hearing of both
sides should precede a restraining order and whether security
should be required of the plaintiff. Wisconsin makes the strictest
requirement for the elimination of the ex parte evil by providing
that
"No such restraining order or injunction shall be granted ex-
cept by the circuit court . . . and then only upon such reason-
able notice of application therefor as a presiding judge of such
court may direct by order to show cause, but in no case less
than 48 hours. . .
While the Massachusetts statute 2111 is not nearly so sweeping in
terms, the practice of its courts has substantially eliminated the
issuance of restraining orders before a hearing.2'1 In New York,
203 Stephens v. Ohio State Telephone Co., 240 Fed. 759 (N. D. Ohio,
1917). But cf. King v. Weiss & Lesh Mfg. Co., 266 Fed. 257, 261 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1920); Great Northern Ry. v. Local G. F. L. of I. A. of M.,
283 Fed. 557 (D. Mont. 1922).
206 McCauley v. First Trust & Savings Bank, 276 Fed. 117 (C. C. A. 7th,
1921); Day v. United States, 19 F. (2d) 21 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927); United
States v. Taliaferro, supra note 159.
207 From RnPORT OF CLAv'oN CoMTrrrEE, H. Rep. 612, 62d Cong., 2d
Sess., p. 4.
208 See references supra note 183.
209 WiS. STAT. (1927) § 133.07 (2). For a discussion by a Wisconsin
lawyer as to how this statute has resulted in actual practice, see SENT
HE.RINGS ON S. 1482, p. 562.
210 MAss. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 214, § 9. A bill (House-No. 562) intro-
duced in the 1929 session of the Massachusetts legislature, proposed to
amend this provision by adding the following new sentence: "No preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order shall be granted in industrial
disputes between employers and employees, but the court shall proceed to
hear evidence on such matters and determine requests for injunctive relief
in such cases as expeditiously as the ends of justice may require."
211 Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit. supra note 4, at 367. Governor Allen,
in his first message to the Massachusetts legislature in January 1929, made
the following recommendations concerning procedure affecting the labor
injunction: "The furtherance of amicable relations between capital and
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on the other hand, the practice of issuing ex parte orders is
prevalent, but attempts at legislative restriction have signally
failed.212
labor is one of the first concerns of government, particularly in a State
so predominantly industrialized as is this Commonwealth. Considerations
of justice as well as those of economic welfare admonish us to remove real
grievances and to avoid reasonable grounds for believing that there are
grievances. The use of the injunction in trade disputes has for a number
of years been a source of widespread irritation to labor throughout the
country, and both Congress and the States have had to take measures
against abuses. Fortunately, in this Commonwealth the practices of our
courts have avoided many misuses of the injunction. Thus our courts,
upon their own initiative, have generally refrained from issuing injunctions
upon an ex parte hearing and without adequate investigation of the facts.
On this and other phases pertaining to the issuance of labor injunctions,
it would appear to be the part of wisdom to formulate the usual practices
of judicial procedure into positive law in order that they may be defined
as the accepted standards applicable to all cases, precluding departure
therefrom in individual cases. I recommend the passage of legislation
which will provide that no injunctive relief shall be given in labor disputes
unless both parties have had an opportunity to be heard on the facts on
which the petition for the injunction is based."
212Assembly Bill 113; Assembly Bill 949; S. Bill 213,-providing "No
restraining order or injunction by either party to an industrial dispute
shall be made by any court of this state otherwise than upon notice and
after hearing. . . ." In the 1929 session, a bill was introduced requiring
three days notice as a prerequisite to the issuance of a restraining order
in an industrial dispute. Assembly Bill 51.
The exacerbated feelings of labor are revealed in the following exag-
gerated statement by the counsel foi the State Federation of Labor, as
reported in the N. Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1928, at 2: "Ninety-nine percent of
the injunctions signed on papers from one party and without a hearing
are vacated or modified a few days later after a hearing, but the harm then
has been done. The belief is growing that the courts are being used in
the interests of the employers. It is creating a communistic spirit."
Equally revealing is the statement of objections to these bills filed by a
Committee of the Bar Association of the City of New York: "If the
advocates of this bill intended that an illegal act should not be restrained,
the bill deserves no consideration. If the bill contemplates only rightful
acts it is reiterative of the present law and becomes mere surplusage."
AssociATIoN OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK, Cori nnTTEE ON AM1END-
MENT OF THE LAW, BuLL. No. 5 (1928) 153; see also N. Y. Times, March
7, 1928, at 7. Such a view is "indifferent to experience in disregarding the
aim of the bill to withhold equitable relief only until it could be determined
with some reasonable accuracy that illegal acts were really being com-
mitted. The Committee said further: "The danger is that when damage
is imminent it will be accomplished before a hearing can be had." This
overlooks the fact that the grant of a labor injunction before the facts
are known may lead to the same danger of irreparable damage to the
defendants. The author of this report had evidently forgotten the provision
under the early judiciary act which forbade issuance of any injunction
"without reasonable previous notice to the adverse party." 1 Stat. 335.
It will be recalled that Mr. Taft in 1908 suggested the return to this
"original practice." See supra note 189.
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Nowhere has legislative inroad been made upon the procedure
of basing injunctions upon affidavits, rather than following the
more reliable method of hearings in open court.213 In New York,
Governor Smith twice recommended "that before such injunc-
tions are issued a preliminary hearing be held to establish the
facts." 214 In the 1928 session of the New York legislature, two
bills were presented calling for a jury trial on the facts.2'5 The
bills never emerged from committee. Without legislation, courts
have found themselves with ample resources to assure a respon-
sible procedure in these cases. It is a rule in some of the federal
districts that the judge may call witnesses,2'1 and in many cases
judges have done so. 21 7
The power exercised by judges in proceedings for contempt of
court yields an important chapter in the political history both
of England 218 and of the United States.2'0  The grievances
aroused by summary prosecutions for contempt and their legis-
lative appeasement long antedate labor injunctions.2 But the
incidence of hardship has fallen heaviest, in our day, upon labor,
because of the widespread threat of summary punishment con-
veyed by every labor injunction. Such is its essential meaning,
if not indeed its purpose. The heart of the problem is the power,
for all practical purposes, of a single judge to issue orders, to
interpret them, to declare disobedience and to sentence. Doubt-
less as a reflex of the Debs case,22' a bill passed the Senate, as
213 It ig worth noting that in patent litigation, questions of fact may
within the court's discretion be tried by a jury of from five to twelve perzons.
28 U. S. C. § 772 (1926). This statute was enacted in 1875, 18 STAT. 316.
214 Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit. supra note 4, at 377. Also the
Governor's message to the legislature in 1928, 37 STATE DEPT. REP. 447,
553. Governor Roosevelt's message to the legislature in 1929 repeated the
recommendation in this language: "The prohibiting of the granting of
temporary injunctions in individual disputes without notice of hearing;
and provision for trial before a jury of any alleged violations of injunc-
tions." N. Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1929, at 18.
215 Assembly Bills 113, 399. For disapproving comment, see ASOCIAuTION
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK, op. cit. supra note 212, at 155.
21-3 STRmT, FEDERAL EQUITY Prmorirc (1909) § 2,322, n. 81. See New
York, N. H. & H. R. R. v. Railway Employees' Dept., 288 Fed. 58S (D.
Conn. 1923).
217See Tri-City Cent. T. Council v. American Steel Foundries; Alaska
S. S. Co. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n; King v. Weiss & Lezh
Mfg. Co.; Kroger Grocery & B. Co. v. Retail Clerks' Ass'n; Montgomery
v. Pacific Electric Ry., all supra note 128.
218 See Fox, THE HISTORY OF CONTEIMPT OF COURT (1927).
210 Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Con gress ovcr Procedure in
Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts (1924) 37 HAnv. L. REv.
1010; Nelles, Contempt by Publication in the Unzitcd Statc3 -ince the
Federal Contempt Statute (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 401, 525.
220 Frankfurter and Landis, op. cit. gupra note 219, at 1020 et seq.,
10-i9-50.
221 In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 15 Sup. Ct. 900 (1895).
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early as 1896, granting trial by jury in cases of "indirect con-
tempt"-obstructions, that is, to a court's authority not within
the presence of the judge.22 2 The measure was founded on mod-
ern conceptions of political liberty. Senator Bacon of Georgia
put the matter bluntly:
"I think the lodgment of the power in any one man to deter-
mine whether personal liberty shall be taken is something entire-
ly inconsistent with the genius of this age and with the spirit of
our institutions ...
. . . he is judge and jury and prosecutor in the case in
which he has this personal feeling." 22 3
But this bill did not come out of the House Judiciary Commit-
tee.224 At each succeeding Congress 225 Representative Bartlett
of Georgia introduced a similar bill, until in the Sixty-second
Congress the proposal was favorably reported and passed the
House.226 Finally, in the Sixty-third Congress the agitation cul-
minated in law.227
Detailed regulations for contempt proceedings became part of
the Clayton Act. The most significant change was based upon
the report made by the House Judiciary Committee to the pre-
vious Congress:
"That complaints have been made and irritation has arisen
out of the trial of persons charged with contempt in the Federal
Courts is a matter of general and common knowledge. The
charge most commonly made is that the courts, under the equity
power, have invaded the criminal domain and under the guise of
trials for contempt have really convicted persons of substantive
crimes for which, if indicted, they would have had a constitu-
tional right to be tried by jury." 228
Summary trial by a single judge gave way to trial by jury, but
only in a narrow class of cases and under strictly defined con-
ditions. Amelioration in contempt procedure, introduced by the
Clayton Act, applies only when a contempt also constitutes a
222 S. 2984, 54th Cong., 1st Sess. See 51 CONG. REC. 14370 (1914) for a
summary of the history and debates upon that measure.
223 28 CONG. REC. 6378 (1896).
224 28 CONG. REC. 6443 (1896).
225 See 51 CONG. REC. 9664 (1914) for this history. See the Democratic
platform of 1908: "Experience has proved the necessity of a modification
of the present law relating to injunctions, and we reiterate the pledge of
our national platforms of 1896 and 1904 in favor of the measure which
passed the Senate in 1896 [which was the Hill bill], but which a Republican
Congress has ever since refused to enact, relating to contempts in Federal
courts and providing for trial by jury in case of indirect contempt."
PROCEEDINGS OF THE DEmOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION (1908) 168.
220 H. R. 22591, 62d Cong., 2d Sess.
227 Sections 21 and 22 of the Clayton Act. 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 28 V.
S. C. §§ 386, 387 (1926).
228 H. Rep. No. 613, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. p. 6.
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criminal offence under any statute of the United States or under
the laws of the state in which the alleged contempt was com-
mitted. In such cases there must be presented a formal charge
giving reasonable grounds for belief that a contempt has been
committed; the defendant must be given an opportunity to purge
himself of the contempt; he is not to be arrested unless he re-
fuses to answer; provision is made for reasonable bail pending
the disposition of the charge; when demanded by the accused,
trial Must 229 be by jury.23 But even in this limited class of
cases, the right to jury trial does not apply when the contempt is
in the presence of the court or so near as to obstruct the adminis-
tration of justice, or when the contempt is violation of an injunc-
tion granted on behalf of the United States. Limits are also set
to the court's discretion in imposing punishment upon a verdict
of guilty: imprisonment for not more than sLx months, and a
fine of not more than $1000.231,
The requirement of jury trial is, of course, the heart of these
reforms and the feature against which, according to the Clayton
committee, "the most strenuous argument has been directed." '-
It was said to "cast suspicion and reflection on every judge," 23
to frustrate enforcement of injunctions in labor disputes by
"sending the accused to the friends of the accused for trial." 22
229 "Such trial may be by the court, or, upon the demand of the accused,
by a jury. . . ." was held to be mandatory and not a permissive provision
within the power of judges to withhold. Michaelson v. United States, 26G
U. S. 42, 45 Sup. Ct. 18 (1924); cf. Supervisors v. United States, 4 Wall.
435, 446-47 (U. S. 1866). The point was argued in the congressional
debates. 51 CONG. REC. 16284 (1914).
230 The minority report offered a substitute bill (H. R. 21722, G2d Cong.,
2d Sess.) which in lieu of a right to jury trial, gave the accused the
right to have a judge, other than the one who issued the injunction, desig-
nated to try and determine the charge of contempt.
231 The sections of the Clayton Act dealing with contempt appear 38 STAT.
738-739 (1914), 28 U. S. C. §§ 386, 387, 388, 389 (1926). Section 25 of
the Act provides: "No proceeding for contempt shall be instituted against
a person unless begun within one year from the date of the act complained
of; nor shall any such proceeding be a bar to any criminal prosecution
for the same act or acts." 38 STAT. 740 (1914), 28 U. S. C. § 390 (1926).
232 H. Rep. No. 613, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. to accompany H. R. 22591, p. 6.
233 See 51 CONG. REC. 9670 (1914).
234 Mr. 'Walker, testifying concerning contempt bill in House Hearings
said: "Congress would be sending the accused to the friends of the accused
for trial and the friends of the accused would acquit the accused just as
the ecclesiastical courts always acquitted a clergyman when accused of
crime. The result would be that the injunctions issued by the Federal
judge in labor disputes never could be enforced." HARMINGS BEFO1 THE
House- Co~mrrrnn ON THE JUDICLUY, IN-TUNCTIO'NS (1912) 62d Cong., 1st
Sess. p. 145.
G. F. Monaghan, attorney for Nationhl Founders' Association, testifying
against a bill requiring jury trial for contempt cases (H. R. 13578, 62d
Cong., 2d Sess.): "If such a condition were imposed it would b2 tanta-
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To which answer was made by Senator Walsh of Montana,
spokesman of the view that prevailed:
"Test the plan by what may be considered likely to be its oper-
ation in connection with the very class of cases that give rise
to the prominence it has attained in present day thought. An
injunction has issued in an industrial dispute. It is charged that
it has been violated. If the judge himself assumes to determine
whether it has been or it has not been, he can scarcely hope to
make a decision that will not subject him to the charge, if he
finds the prisoner guitly, of subserviency to the capitalistic in-
terests or hostility to organized labor, or if he shall acquit, to
pusillanimity or the ambition of the demagogue. In either case
his court suffers in the estimation of no inconsiderable body of
citizens. How much wiser it would be to call in a jury to resolve
the simple question of fact as to whether the defendant did or
did not violate the injunction. What good reason is there for
believing that a jury will be likely to disregard their oaths, turn a
deaf ear to the plain admonitions of duty, and acquit a defendant
flagrantly guilty? ...Their verdict would silence caviling and
strengthen in the minds of the people the conviction that the
courts are indeed the dispensers of justice and not engines of op-
pression." 235
Another decade had to pass before what Congress did was
given meaning and validity by the courts. Resort to jury trials
for contempt was a marked innovation in this country. 80 Natur-
ally enough, the courts rigorously applied the restrictions which
Congress had itself expressed. 23T  But however restricted, the
right to a trial by jury upon charge of contempt was a gift which
mount to a denial to the court of the right to issue an injunction in any
instance .... It must be understood that a violation of the court's order is
to be answered at once and by a court not so likely to be swayed by con-
siderations of sentiment or interest as is usually the case with juries."
Ibid. 175.
23- 51 CONG. REC. 14369 (1914); see also the powerful argument of John
W. Davis of West Virginia, 48 CONG. REC. App. 313 (1912).
226 As to the place of the jury in the vindication of law and in fostering
confidence in its administration, see Frankfurter and Landis, op. cit. supra
note 219, at 1054, n. 160. Reference is therein made, inter" alia, to those
judgments upon the jury system: Hamilton--"the more the operation of
the institution [of trial by jury] has fallen under my observation, the
more reason I have discovered for holding it in high estimation."; Mr.
Justice Story--"The trial by jury is justly dear to the American people.";
Chief Justice von Moschzisker-"I have taken part in one capacity or
another, in the trial or review of thousands of cases, and this experience
has given me faith in the jury system .... particularly where inferences
must be drawn .... the advantage in deciding questions of fact lieHs on
the side of the .... jury."; Lord Justice Bankes-"The standard of much
that is valuable in the life of the community has been set by juries in civil
cases. They have proved themselves in the past to be a great safeguard
against many forms of wrongg and oppression. They are essentially a
good tribunal to decide cases in which there is hard swearing on either
side, or a direct conflict of evidence on matters of fact .... 
930
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Congress could not bestow. Such was the constitutional chal-
lenge against these provisions, and it prevailed with two lower
federal CoUlts.23 8 This, in brief, was the argument: the power
to issue decrees implies the power to vindicate the court's author-
ity upon disobedience, by punishment for contempt if necessary;
this is an "inherent power" of the federal courts, which may not
be taken away or modified by congressional changes of proce-
dure. In so ruling, the courts deemed themselves loyal to a
cardinal dogma of American constitutional law-the doctrine of
the separation of powers. Judge Baker, a very able judge who
spoke for the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
resolved by a metaphor constitutional doubts affecting the valid-
ity of a long-matured statute:
"Viewing the inferior courts, and also the Supreme Court as
an appellate tribunal, we see that Congress, the agency to exer-
cise the legislative power of the United States, can, as a potter,
shape the vessel of jurisdiction, the capacity to receive; but, the
vessel having been made, the judicial power of the United States
is poured into the vessel, large or small, not by Congress, but by
the Constitution." 239
Happily, the Supreme Court of the United States discarded
this empty dialectic, and put the statute in the context of reality
237 Couts v. United States, 249 Fed. 595 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918). Also see
Cole v. United States, 298 Fed. 86 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924); Patton v. United
States, 288 Fed. 812, 815 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923) ; Taliaferro v. United State:,
290 Fed. 906 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923). It has been suggested in one case that
contempt of a federal injunction is itself a crime against the United StatcZ.
Taylor v. linited States, 2 F. (2d) 444 (C. C. A. 7th, 1924); Armstrong
v. United States, 18 F. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927), ccrt. denied, 275 U.
S. 534, 48 Sup. Ct. 30 (1927); Forrest v. United States, 277 Fed. S73 (C.
C. A. 9th, 1922), cert. denied, 258 U. S. 629, 42 Sup. Ct. 462 (1922). It
was held that the jury trial provision is applicable only when the relation
of employer and employee exists, and that relation does not exist in the
case of an illegal strike. Michaelson v. United States, 291 Fed. 940 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1923), rev'd, 266 U. S. 42, 45 Sup. Ct. 18 (1924), criticized in Note
(1924) 37 HARv. L. REV. 486. For a similar result, see Sandefur v. Canoe
Creek Coal Co., 293 Fed. 379 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923), aff'd, 266 U. S. 42, 70,
45 Sup. Ct. 18, 21 (1924). In Canoe Creek Coal Co. v. Christinson, 281 Fed.
559 (W. D. Ky. 1922), it was held that only contempts based on the anti-
trust laws were within the purview of the jury trial sections and conse-
quently, contemnors of a federal injunction where federal jurisdiction was
based on other federal statutes or on diversity of citizenship, could not
claim a jury trial. This was quickly reversed. 293 Fed. 379 (C. C. A.
6th, 1923). So, also, a case where the plaintiff was a receiver, the contempt
proceedings were held not within the purview of the section. McGibbony
v. Lancaster, 286 Fed. 129 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923); see Note (1924) 37 HnRV.
L. RBv. 486.
23SIn re Atchison, 284 Fed. 604 (S. D. Fla. 1922) and Michaelson v.
United States, 291 Fed. 940 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923). These dccision, are
criticized in (1923) 32 YAIE L. J. 843; Note (1923) 36 HAnv. L. REV. 1012;
and in Frankfurter and Landis, op. cit. supra note 219, especially at n. 13G.
239 Michaelson v. United States, supra note 238, at 946.
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and experience.2 40 The Court concluded that "the statute now
under review," granting the privilege of "a trial by jury upon
demand of the accused in an independent proceeding at law for a
criminal contempt which is also a crime," did not "invade the
powers of the courts as intended by the Constitution or violate
that instrument in any other way." 241 But state courts discov-
ered more controlling bars in the Constitution against similar
state legislation. They found the doctrine of the separation of
powers more inflexible than it had revealed itself to the Supreme
Court. As to the mode of proceeding for criminal contempt,
what has been must remain. Summary practice in contempt
proceedings, which had been justified on historic grounds now
known to be spurious, 42 was deemed by these courts beyond
legislative reach.
These state decisions indicate the important time element in
constitutional adjudications. They came in the earlier stages
of the movement for this reform and, unfortunately, before the
Supreme Court of the United States gave the lead to a more
statesman-like perception that the doctrine of separation of
powers is a political maxim2 43 and not a rigid and technical
rule of law.24 4  Failure to appreciate this led to early nullifica-
tions, by: the courts of Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma and Virginia, of statutes providing
for jury trial in contempt proceedings.24; The Michigan Su-
preme Court placed itself in the grip of one of those factitious
arguments, which so often ensnare judges by making them forget
that the complexities of life cannot be confined within a dialectic
dilemma:
240 United States v. Michaelson, 266 U. S. 42, 45 Sup. Ct. 18 (1924).
241 Ibid. 66-67, 45 Sup. Ct. at 20.
242 The practice of summary punishment for contempt and the theory on
which it is based, rest on the undelivered judgment of Mr. Justice Wilmot
in The King v. Almon (1765), printed by his son in WILMOT'S NOTSS (1802)
243. See Fox, op. cit. supra note 218, at 5 et seq.; Frankfurter and Landig,
op. cit. supra note 219, at 1042. et seq.
243 See correspondence by Madison in xlvii THE FEDEALXST (Lodge ed.)
299; see also MIMNE, PoPuLAR GOVERNMENT (1886) 219.
244"The exigencies of government have made it necessary to relax a
merely doctrinaire adherence to a principle so flexible and practical, so
largely a matter of sensible proximation, as that of the separation of
powers." Cardozo, C. J. in Matter of Richardson, 247 N. Y. 401, 410, 160
N. E. 655, 657 (1928).
245 State v. Shepard, 177 Mo. 205, 76 S. W. 79 (1903); Smith v. Speed,
11 Okla. 95, 66 Pac. 511 (1901); Carter's Case, 96 Va. 791, 32 S. E. 780
(1899) ; Burdett's Case, 103 Va. 838, 48 S. E. 878 (1904) ; Nichols v. Judge
of Superior Court, 130 Mich. 187, 89 N. W. 691 (1902); Hale v. The State,
55 Ohio St. 210, 45 N. E. 199 (1896) ; Ex Parte McCown, 139 N. C. 95, 51 S.
E. 957 (1905); Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss. 331 (1858).
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"There is no middle ground; either the courts have the abso-
lute control under the Constitution in contempt proceedings or
they have only such as the legislature may see fit to confer." 21
Mlore recently, in 1911, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court also held unconstitutional 27 a requirement for trial by
jury "on the issue of fact only as to whether he [the accused]
committed the acts alleged to constitute the said violation." 21
The court felt itself bound by the following earlier dictum of
Chief Justice Gray:
"The summary power to convict and punish for contempt tend-
ing to obstruct or degrade the administration of justice is inher-
ent in Courts of Chancery and other Superior Courts, as essen-
tial to the execution of their powers and to the maintenance of
their authority, and is part of the law of the land, within the
meaning of Magna Charta and of the twelfth article of our Dec-
laration of Rights." 249
The United States Supreme Court has shown that also in law
there is such a thing as adaptation of means to ends; that we
need not choose between arbitrary limitation upon the power of
courts to vindicate their authority and arbitrary restriction upon
the forms of such vindication. In order to mitigate abuses of
judicial power without attenuating its essential authority, new
forms may be devised or old forms revived. Trial by jury in con-
tempt proceedings is an innovation in modern practice, but it is
a return to what is old in the history of English law.2- °
Since the Clayton Act, provisions for jury trial have been
adopted in New Jersey, Utah and Wisconsin.2- a Two such bills
were before the New York legislature in 1928.232 They failed of
passage. Lawyers predominate in legislatures, and their views
on this subject largely reflect the sentiment expressed in the
2" Nichols v. Judge of Superior Court, supra note 245.247 Walton Lunch Co. v. Kearney, 236 Mass. 310, 128 N. E. 429 (1920).
248 MASS. STAT. (1911) c. 339, § 1. In the Massachusetts legislature for
1929, a bill (House-No. 315) was introduced providing for trial by jury
whenever the violation of an injunction involves "an act which is a crime
per se."
249 Cartright's Case, 114 Mass. 230, 238 (1873).
250 It cannot be too often recalled that "Novelty is not a constitutional
objection.. . ." Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 419,
39 Sup. Ct. 553, 555 (1919). But jury trial for contempt out of court has
an ancient English pedigree. F. Solly-Flood, Q. C., The Story of Prizce
Henri of Monmoufh and Chief Justice Gascoign (1885) 3 TRA1's. ROYAL
HIST. Soc. (N. S.) 47, 147. See Fox, op. cit. sztpra note 242, at App. 227
et seq.; Frankfurter and Landis, op. cit. supra note 219, at 1042 et seq.
251 N. J. Laws 1925, c. 169 (leaving trial by jury for contempt of any or-
der relating "to a labor dispute" to "the discretion of the vice chancellor") ;
UTAH COAP. LAWS (1917) § 3655; Wis. STAT. (1927) § 133.07(4) (the
constitutionality of thiE; statute now awaits decision before the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin in Adler & Sons Co. v. Maglio).
252 Assembly Bills Nos. 113, 949.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
adverse report made by a committee of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York:
"The court is practically stripped of its power to enforce its
mandate. A jury is required to pass upon the question, a cum-
bersome and expensive method. The wish of one juror would
frustrate the proceeding. Court mandates would fall into dis-
repute and become innocuous." 213
Such Cassandra wails come readily to lawyers' lips.24 If these
forebodings are nourished by reason rather than by fear of
change, surely there would be some proof that the federal courts
have suffered evil consequences through the introduction of jury
trial in contempt cases. Such ill effects, if any there were, would
have found some expression in responsible professional opinion
or through the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges,2H now serv-
ing as the articulate voice of the needs of the lower federal courts.
This concludes a resum6 of the main currents of legislation
affecting labor injunctions. What are we to say of its meaning?
Surely that the position of labor before the law has been altered,
if at all, imperceptibly. Common-law doctrines of conspiracy
and restraint of trade still hold sway; activities widely cherished
as indispensable assertions of trade union life continue to be out-
lawed. Statutes designed to contract equity jurisdiction have
25 3 
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, op. cit. supra note
212, at 154.
254 The psychologic factors which condition the attitude of lawyers
towards reform have been luminously analyzed by Senator Root: "Law-
yers are essentially conservative. They do not take kindly to change. They
are not naturally reformers. . . . The most successful lawyers are, as a
rule, continually engrossed in their own cases and they have little time
and little respect for the speculative and hypothetical. The lawyers who
have authority as leaders of opinion are men, as a rule, who have succeded
in their profession, and men naturally tend to be satisfied with the condi-
tons under whch they are succeeding.... The measure which the com-
mittees of the Association have advocated have got a little farther each
year, and they will ultimately arrive, but at every stage they have been
blocked by opposition from lawyers. This has always come from lawyers
who had succeeded and were content with things as they were; who did
not want practice and proceedings changed from that with which they were
familiar and who never had acquired the habit of responding to any public
opinion of the Bar of the United States. If the administration of justice
in the United States is to improve rather than to deteriorate, there must
be such a public opinion of the Bar, and it must create standards of thought
and of conduct which have their origin not in the interest of particular
cases but in the broader considerations of those relations which the pro-
fession of the law bears to the administration of justice as a whole." Elihu
Root, The Layman's Criticism of the Lawyer (1914) 39 A. B. A. REP. 386,
390-91. See also ROOT, ADDRESSES ON CITIZENSHIP AND GOVERNMENT (1916)
433.
255 See FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPRnEME COURT
(1928) c. 6.
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been construed merely as endorsements of the jurisdiction there-
tofore exercised. Even the procedural incidents of the equity
process which make it so dangerous a device in labor controver-
sies have not been systematically adjusted to modern needs; safe-
guards are all too dependent on the wisdom and fair-dealing of
occasional judges. The one notable change, so far as the federal
courts and a few states are concerned, is the protection of jury
trial in contempt proceedings involving accusations of crime.
This record of legislative ineffectiveness is the product of more
than a temper of inhospitality on the part of the judiciary.
Shortcomings in legislative draftsmanship are factors, and the
interests of labor, in so far as they coincide with the civilized
aims of society, are too often handicapped by lack of highly
skilled legal advisers. But when three decades of legislative ac-
tivity leave a dominant impression of futility, it is fair to assume
that a sufficiently strong and informed public opinion either does
not care enough about these measures or is incapable of trans-
lating its purposes into law.
